House Manager Charles Canady's Statement on Constitutional Law
January 16, 1999
REP. CHARLES CANADY (R-FLORIDA): Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished counsel, and ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I'm Representative Charles Canady
of the 12th district of Florida.
And I rise now to conclude the argument that my two
fellow managers have begun and to address the fundamental
question now before the Senate.
Do the offenses charged against the president rise to the
level of high crimes and misdemeanors under our Constitution?
Are these crimes -- perjury before a federal grand jury and
obstruction of justice -- offenses for which the president has
properly been impeached by the House and for which he may now
properly be convicted by the Senate?
Or are these serious felonies offenses for which a chief
executive may not constitutionally be called to account by
either the House or the Senate?
To properly answer these questions must be understood, as my
fellow manager Mr. Buyer has argued, that perjury and
obstruction of justice are serious offenses against the system
of justice.
To properly answer these questions, it must also be
understood, as my fellow manager Mr. Graham has just discussed,
that the Senate has already that as a serious offense against
the system of justice, perjury is proper grounds for removal
from office.
There are several additional points that I now ask
you to consider as you deliberate on the momentous issue you are
called on to decide.
First, I will argue that restricting the impeachment process
to crimes involving the abuse of presidential power is contrary
to common sense. This is a key point in this case. The
president's case hinges to a large extent on his claim that the
offenses charged against him do not involve official misconduct.
I will then review the history and purpose of the impeachment
process to show that its fundamental object is to maintain the
supremacy of law against the misconduct of public officials.
After reviewing the background of the impeachment process, I
will briefly discuss the prevailing views on the seriousness of
perjury at the time the Constitution was adopted and show that
perjury and obstruction of justice are akin to bribery both in
their purpose and in their effect.
To conclude, I will discuss the proper role of the
Senate in exercising the removal power, emphasizing three
essential points.
First, that the removal power is designed to preserve,
protect and strengthen our Constitution by setting a standard of
conduct for public officers.
Second, that the Senate should not establish a lower standard
of integrity for the President of the United States than the
standard it has already established for federal judges.
Third, that the Senate should not allow a president who has
violated his constitutional duty, and oath of office and made
himself a notorious example of lawlessness to remain in office.
The president's lawyers have argued that the Constitution
requires proof of official misconduct for impeachment and
conviction, and that removal from office is not proper for
crimes that do not involve an abuse of the power of office.
This view has also been endorsed by various
academics who have signed a letter in support of the president.
Now, the Senate must decide is this interpretation is a proper
interpretation of the Constitution.
In deciding this question, you should be guided by common
sense and good judgment. It is by no means an abstruse and
mysterious matter of constitutional law, nor is it a new
question before the Senate. It has been decided in the recent
judicial impeachments which Mr. Graham has discussed, and it is
a question which arose 200 years ago in the course of the first
impeachment trial conducted by the Senate.
At that trial in January of 1799, as the Senate met in
Philadelphia, an argument was made by counsel for the
respondent, Senator Blount (ph) of Tennessee, that the
impeachment power was properly exercised only with respect to
official offenses.
Although Senator Blount (ph) escaped conviction on other
grounds, the response to his claim that only official misconduct
could justify impeachment and removal remains noteworthy today.
Robert Goodlow Harper (ph) of South Carolina, one of
the House managers, and who incidentally subsequently served as
a member of this Senate representing the state of Maryland,
refuted that claim by asking a simple question. He said:
"Suppose a judge of the United States to commit a theft or
perjury. Would the learned counsel say that he should not be
impeached for it? If so, he must remain in office with all his
infamy."
Two hundred years to the month after Robert Goodlow Harper
posed that question to the Senate, a very similar question is
before the Senate today. Shall a president, if found guilty of
perjury and obstruction of justice, be removed or must he remain
in office with all his infamy?
Although a judge who commits crimes may be subjected to
criminal penalties and prevented from discharging judicial
functions, he can be divested of his office only by impeachment
and removal.
The tenure of a president will necessarily expire with the
passage of time.
But most scholars of constitutional law agree that
while he remains in office he is immune from the processes of
the criminal law. So long as he is president, the only
mechanism available to hold him accountable for his crimes is
the power of impeachment and removal.
Unless that power is exercised, not matter what crimes he has
committed, he must remain in office with all his infamy.
The argument of the president's lawyers that no criminal act
by the president subjects him to removal of office unless the
crime involves abuse of his power is an argument entailing
consequences which upon a moments reflection this body should be
unwilling to accept.
Would a president guilty of murder be immune from the
constitutional process of impeachment and removal so long as his
crime involved no misuse of official power?
Would a president guilty of sexual assault of child molesting
remain secure in office because his crime did not involve an
abuse of office?
In support of their position, the president's
lawyers have vigorously argued that a president who committed
tax fraud -- a felony offense not involving official misconduct
-- would not be subject to impeachment and removal.
They erroneously cite the decision of the House Judiciary
Committee rejecting an article of impeachment against President
Nixon for tax fraud. The record of the House proceeding
establishes that the tax fraud article against President Nixon
was rejected due to insufficient evidence that he was in fact
guilty of tax fraud. The House Judiciary Committee never
determined that tax fraud by a president would not be grounds
for impeachment.
But leaving aside the inaccurate characterization of the
House Judiciary Committee's action, the claim of the president's
lawyers that a president could commit tax fraud and remain
immune from impeachment and removal is quite telling. It
reveals a great deal about the sort of standard they would set
for the conduct of the president of the United States.
The claim that tax fraud -- a felony -- does not rise to the
level of a high crime or misdemeanor was, as you have heard,
unequivocally rejected by the Senate in 1986 in the case of
Judge Harry Claiborne, who was removed from office for filing
false income tax returns.
Then-Senator Albert Gore, Jr., summarized the
judgment of the Senate that Judge Claiborne should be removed
from office. The comments of Senator Gore bear repeating:
He said, "It is incumbent upon the Senate to fulfill its
constitutional responsibility and strip this man of his title.
An individual who has knowingly falsified tax returns has no
business receiving a salary derived from the tax dollars of
honest citizens."
Of course, the rationale expressed by Senator Gore for the
conviction of Judge Claiborne for his criminal tax offenses
applies with equal -- if not greater -- force to similar
offenses committed by a president of the United States.
Professor Charles Black, Jr., in his essay on the law of
impeachment, recognized the appropriate application of these
principles to the office of the presidency. Professor Black
said, "A large-scale tax cheat is not a viable chief
magistrate."
I would respectfully submit to the Senate that the
argument of the president's lawyers concerning tax fraud by a
president is not a viable argument. Who can seriously argue
that our Constitution requires that a president guilty of crimes
such as murder, sexual assault or tax fraud remain in office
undisturbed?
Who is willing to set such a standard for the conduct for the
president of the United States? Who can in good conscience
accept the consequences for our system of government that would
necessarily follow? Could our Constitution possibly contemplate
such a result?
What other crimes of a president will we be told do not rise
to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors? These are grave
questions that must be addressed by this Senate. The
president's offense requires that these questions be asked and
answered.
Contrary to the claims of the president's lawyers, there is
not a bright line separating official misconduct by a president
from other misconduct of which the president is guilty.
Some offenses will involve the direct and
affirmative misuse of governmental power. Other offenses may
involve a more subtle use of the prestige, status and position
of the president to further a course of wrongdoing. There are
still other offenses in which a president may not misuse the
powers of his office, but in which he violates a duty imposed on
him under the Constitution.
Such a breach of constitutional duty, even though it does not
involve an affirmative misuse of governmental power, may be a
very serious matter. It does violence to the English language
to assert that a president who has violated a duty entrusted to
him by the Constitution is not guilty of official misconduct.
Common sense indicates that official misconduct has indeed
occurred whenever a president breaches any of the duties of his
office.
As we have been reminded repeatedly, the Constitution imposes
on the president the duty to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed. The charges against the president in this
case involve multiple violations of that duty.
A president who commits a calculated and sustained
series of criminal offenses has, by his personal violations of
the law, failed in the most immediate, direct and culpable
manner to do his duty under the Constitution.
In their defense of the president, his lawyers in essence
contend that a president may be removed for misusing
governmental power, but not for corruptly interfering with the
proper exercise of governmental power. This argument exalts
form over substance. It unduly focuses on the manner in which
wrongdoing is carried out and neglects to consider the actual
impact of that wrongdoing on our system of government.
Whether the president misuses the power vested in him as
president, or wrongfully interferes with the power -- with the
proper exercise of the power vested in other parts of the
government, the result is the same. The due functioning of our
system of government is in some respect hindered or defeated.
There is no principled basis for contending that a president
who interferes with the proper exercise of governmental power,
as he clearly does when he commits perjury and obstruction of
justice, is constitutionally less blameworthy that a president
who misuses the powers of his office.
A president who lies to a federal grand jury in
order to impede the investigation of crimes is no less culpable
than a president who wrongfully orders a prosecutor to suspend
an investigation of crimes that may have been committed.
The purpose and effect of the personal perjury and of the
wrongful official command are the same.
The laws of the United States are not properly enforced.
Although neither the Senate nor the House has ever adopted a
fixed definition of high crimes and misdemeanors, there is much
in the background and history of the impeachment process that
contradicts the narrow view of the removal power advanced by the
president's lawyers.
There is no convincing evidence that those who framed and
ratified our Constitution intended to limit the impeachment and
removal power to acts involving the abuse of official power.
The key phrase defining the offenses for which the president,
vice president and other civil officers of the United States may
be removed -- treason, bribery or other high crimes and
misdemeanors -- simply does not limit the removal power in the
way suggested by the president's lawyers.
The truth is, as we have heard already today, that
treason and bribery may be committed by an official who does not
abuse the power of his office in the commission of the offense.
A president might, for example, pay a bribe to a judge presiding
over a case to which the president is an individual party.
Or a judge might commit an act of treason without exercising
any of the powers of his office in doing so. By the express
terms of the Constitution, those offenses would be impeachable.
And there is no reason to impose a restriction on the scope of
high crimes and misdemeanors that is not imposed on treason and
bribery. Although having a means for the removal of officials
guilty of abusing their power was no doubt very much in the
minds of the framers, the purpose of the removal power was not
restricted to that object.
Now, to properly understand the purpose of
impeachment under our Constitution, consideration must be given
to the use of impeachment by the English parliament.
Impeachment in the English system did not require an indictable
crime, but the proceeding was nevertheless of a criminal nature.
Punishment upon conviction could extend to imprisonment and
even death.
It was a mechanism used by the parliament to check absolutism
and to establish the supremacy of the parliament. Through
impeachment, parliament acted to curb the abuses of exalted
persons who would otherwise have free reign.
Impeachment was used by the parliament to punish a wide range
of offenses. Misapplication of funds. Abuse of official power. Neglect of duty. Corruption. Encroachment on the prerogatives
of parliament. And giving harmful advice to the crown. In the
English practice, high crimes and misdemeanors included all of
these.
During the impeachment of Lord Chancellor Macclesfield in
1725, Sergeant Pengelly summed up the purpose of impeachment.
"It was," he said, "for the punishment of offenses of a
public nature which may affect the nation."
He went on to say that impeachment was also for use
in instances where the inferior courts have no power to punish
the crimes committed by ordinary rules of justice or in cases
where the person offending is by his degree raised above the
apprehension of danger from a prosecution carried on in the
usual course of justice. And his exalted station requires the
united accusation of all the Commons.
In the case of Warren Hastings -- which was proceeding at the
time the Constitution was framed -- Edmund Burke described the
impeachment process as "a grave and important proceeding
essential to the establishment of the national character for
justice and equity."
As the British legal historian Holdsworth has written, the
impeachment process was a mechanism in service of the "ideal of
government in accordance with law." It was a means by which
"the greatest ministers of state could be made responsible,
like humble officials, to the law."
According to Holdsworth: The greatest services rendered by
this procedure to the cause of constitutional government have
been, firstly, the establishment of the doctrine of ministerial
responsibility to the law.
Secondly, its applications to all ministers of the
crown. And thirdly, and consequently the maintenance of the
supremacy of law overall.
Thus, the fundamental purpose of the impeachment process in
England was the maintenance of the supremacy of law over all.
Those who were impeached and called to account for high crimes
and misdemeanors were those who by their conduct threatened to
undermine the rule of law.
This English understand of the purpose of impeachment serves
as a backdrop for the work of the framers of our Constitution.
Despite some important differences in the functioning of
impeachment in England, and in the United States, the
fundamental purpose of impeachment remain the same -- defending
the rule of law.
The records of the proceeding of the Constitutional
Convention also shed light on the meaning of high crimes and
misdemeanors, and the underlying the purpose of the impeachment
mechanism.
The primary focus of the relevant discussions at the
Convention was on the need for some means of removing the
president. Early in the proceedings with respect to impeachment,
the committee as a whole agreed to make the president removable
on impeachment and conviction of malpractice or neglect of duty,
although concerns were expressed that impeachment would give the
legislative branch undue control over the executive and violate
the separation of powers.
In the course of the proceedings, James Madison stated that
some provision was needed to defend the community against the
president if he became corrupt, incapacitated, or perverted his
administration into a scheme of peculation or oppression.
Arguing for a means of removing the president, George Mason
said "No point is of more importance than the right of
impeachment should be continued. Shall any man be above
justice? Above all, shall that man be above it who can commit
the most extensive injustice."
Before the Convention settled on the language that was
ultimately adopted, a proposal was considered that would have
limited impeachable offenses to treason and bribery.
An effort was made to broaden this proposal by
including maladministration as an impeachable offense. Madison
objected. He objected that the inclusion of a term as vague as
maladministration would result in the president having tenure
during the pleasure of the senate. As a compromise, the term
maladministration was dropped and high crimes and misdemeanors
was substituted.
From this course of proceedings, it can reasonably be -- it
can reasonably be concluded that poor administration, at least
if it does not involve corrupt motives, is not a sufficient
ground for impeachment.
In the debate concerning the constitution and the various
state ratification conventions, the grounds for impeachment were
with some frequency said to include abuse or betrayal of trust
and abuse of power. Making a bad treaty was also frequently
mentioned as justifying impeachment. At the Virginia
convention, governor Randolph spoke of misbehavior and
dishonesty, and James Madison gave two examples of impeachable
conduct: pardoning a criminal with whom the president was in
collusion, and summoning only a few senators to approve a
treaty.
One of the most extensive recorded discussions of
impeachment occurred at the North Carolina ratification
convention in remarks made by James Iredell (ph). Iredell (ph),
who laster served as a justice of the Supreme Court, spoke of
the supremacy of the law under the system of government proposed
by the Constitution.
He said, "No man has an authority to injure another with
impunity. No citizen is better than his fellow citizens, nor
can pretend to any superiority over the meanest man in the
country. If the president does a single act by which the people
are prejudiced, he is punishable himself. If he commits any
misdemeanor in office, he is impeachable."
Iredell also expressed the view that impeachment may be used
only in cases where there is some corrupt motive. He said,
"When any man is impeached, it must be for an error of the
heart and not of the head. Whatever mistake a man may make, he
ought not to be punished for it nor his posterity rendered
infamous.
But if a man be a villain, and willfully abuse his
trust, he is to be held up as a public offender, and
ignominously punished."
According to these principles I suppose the only instances in
which the president would be liable to impeachment would be
where he had received a bribe or acted from some corrupt motive
or other.
Irdell's (ph) comments buttress the view that impeachment is
not to be used as a political weapon to resolve differences of
policy between the legislative branch and the executive branch.
Impeachment is not an appropriate remedy for errors, even
serious errors in the administration of government.
To justify impeachment, there must be some corrupt motive, a
willful abuse of trust, an error of the heart. You will note
that there is nothing in Irdell's (ph) comments to suggest that
a president who has engaged in a corrupt course of conduct by
obstructing justice and committing perjury would be immune from
impeachment and removal.
Another major discussion during the debate over ratification
occurs in the Federalist Number 65, to which reference has
already been made in this proceedings.
For Alexander Hamilton describes the impeachment process as
"a method of national inquest into the conduct of public men."
And discusses the power of the Senate in their judicial
character as "A court for the trial of impeachments."
Now before I discuss his views on impeachment, I
would like to say a word in defense of Alexander Hamilton who is
a widely acknowledged champion of our Constitution, widely
acknowledged as one of the most eloquent expositors and
defenders of the Constitution.
Unfortunately, the reputation of Alexander Hamilton has in
recent days been traduced (ph). It is unjust to the memory of
this great man to compare his personal sins with the crimes of
President Clinton. When Hamilton was questioned about his
affair, he told the truth. He took responsibility for his
conduct.
There is no evidence that he ever engaged in acts of
corruption. He never lied under oath. He never obstructed
justice.
And notwithstanding the efforts of his lawyers,
President Clinton by no means benefits from a comparison with
Alexander Hamilton.
In the Federalist, Hamilton writes of the Senate, "The
subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed
from the misconduct of public men or in other words from the
abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature
which may with peculiar propriety be denominated political as
they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society
itself."
Hamilton recognized that the focus of the impeachment power
is on the misconduct of public men or the abuse or violation of
some public trust. Impeachment is a remedy against officials
for injuries done to the society itself.
Despite the claims of the president's lawyers, the comments
of Hamilton do not support the view that a president can be
impeached and removed only for an abuse of power.
The misconduct of public men, and the abuse or
violation of some public trust to which Hamilton refers, are not
restricted to offenses involving the misuse of official power.
The misconduct of public men encompasses a whole range of
wrongful deeds committed by those who hold office when those
offenses are committed.
The public trust is violated whenever a public officer
breaches any duty he has to the public. Injuries done to the
society itself similarly may occur as a result of misconduct
that does not involve the misuse of the powers of office.
Now I would submit to the senate that the English precedents,
the records of the constitutional convention debates and the
general principles set forth by Hamilton, Iredell (ph) and
others in the debate over ratification, do not provide a
definitive list of high crimes and misdemeanors. But they do
provide broad guidance concerning the scope of the impeachment
power. The theme running through all these background sources
is that the impeachment process is designed to provide a remedy
for the corrupt and lawless acts of public officials.
Not surprisingly, those who have been on the
receiving end of impeachment proceedings have been quick to
argue for a restrictive meaning of high crimes and misdemeanors.
President Clinton's lawyers follow in that well established
tradition. They attempt to minimize the significance of charges
of perjury and obstruction of justice against the president.
In essence, they argue that treason and bribery are the
prototypical high crimes and misdemeanors and that crimes
charged against the president are insufficiently similar in both
tier nature and seriousness to treason and bribery.
But as the comments of my fellow manager Mr. Buyer have made
clear, the crimes set forth in the articles of impeachment are
indeed serious offenses against our system of justice. They
were certainly viewed as serious offenses by those who drafted
and ratified the Constitution.
In his discussion of "offenses against the public
justice," Sir William Blackstone -- whose work James Madison
said was in "every man's hand" during the creation of the
Constitution -- listed the offenses of perjury and bribery
side-by-side, immediately after he listed treason.
In 1790, the first Congress adopted, as you have already
heard, a statute entitled "An Act for the Punishment of Certain
Crimes Against the United States," making perjury a crime
punishable as a felony. Nothing could be clearer: Perjury is a
crime against the United States; it is not a private matter.
As Mr. Chabot noted yesterday, John Jay, the first Chief
Justice of the United States, said that "there is no crime more
extensively pernicious to society" than perjury. According to
Jay, perjury "discolors and poisons the Streams of Justice, and
by substituting Falsehood for Truth, saps the Foundations of
personal and public Rights." He said, "If oaths should cease
to be held sacred, our dearest and most valuable Rights would
become insecure."
Given this understanding that was current at the
time the Constitution was adopted, it is impossible to support
the conclusion that perjury and the related offense of
obstruction of justice are somehow trivial offenses that do not
rise to the same level as the offense of bribery which is
enumerated in the Constitution.
Moreover, perjury and obstruction of justice are by their
very nature akin to bribery. When the crime of bribery is
committed, money is given and received to corruptly alter the
course of official action.
When justice is obstructed, action is undertaken to corruptly
thwart the due administration of justice. When perjury occurs,
false testimony is given under oath in order to deceive judges
and juries and to prevent the just determination of causes
pending in the courts. The fundamental purpose and the
fundamental effect of each of these offenses -- perjury,
obstruction of justice and bribery alike -- is to defeat the
proper administration of government.
They are all crimes of corruption, aimed at
substituting private advantage for the public interest. They
all undermine the integrity of the functions of government.
The use of the impeachment process against misconduct which
undermines the integrity of government is a central focus of two
reports prepared in 1974 on the background and history of
impeachment.
And I would humbly bring this reports to your attention. I
commend them to you for your consideration.
One of the reports was prepared by the staff of the Nixon
impeachment inquiry. The other was produced by the bar of the
city of New York. Both of these reports have gained bipartisan
respect over the last 25 years for their balanced and judicious
approach.
They provide a well informed analysis of the key issues
related to impeachments.
In doing so they stand in stark contrast to the recent
pronouncements by some academics which substitute political
opinion for scholarly analysis.
A review of these two documents from 1974 supports
the conclusion that the articles before the Senate set forth
compelling grounds for the conviction and removal of President
Clinton.
Now there has been a great deal of comment on the report on
constitutional grounds for presidential impeachment prepared in
February of 1974 by the staff of the Nixon impeachment inquiry.
Those who assert that the charges against the president do not
rise to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors have pulled
some phrases from that report out of context to support their
position.
In fact, the general principles concerning grounds for
impeachment and removal set forth in that report indicate that
perjury and obstruction of justice are high crimes and
misdemeanors. Consider this key language from the staff report
describing the type of conduct which gives rise to the proper
use of the impeachment and removal power.
In the report, they said "The emphasis has been on the
significant effects of the conduct undermining the integrity of
office, disregard of constitutional duties and oath of office,
irrigation of power, abuse of the governmental process, adverse
impact on the system of government."
The report goes on to state, "Because impeachment of
a president is a grave step for the nation, it is to be
predicated only upon conduct seriously incompatible with either
the constitutional form and principles of our government or the
proper performance of constitutional duties of the presidential
office."
Perjury and obstruction of justice, I would submit to you,
clearly undermine the integrity of office. I ask you, if these
offenses do not undermine the integrity of office, what offenses
would?
Their unavoidable consequence is to erode respect for the
office of the president and to interfere with the integrity of
the administration of justice. Such offenses are seriously
incompatible with the president's constitutional duties and oath
of office and with the principles of our government establishing
the rule of law.
Moreover, they are offenses which have a direct and
serious adverse impact on the system of government. Obstruction
of justice is by definition an assault on the due administration
of justice, which is a core function of our system of
government. Perjury has the same purpose and effect.a
The second report to which I have referred, the thoughtful
report on the law of presidential impeachment prepared by the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, in January of
1974, also places a great deal of emphasis on the corrosive
impact of presidential misconduct on the integrity of
government.
The report summarizes the proper basis for impeachment and
removal in this way.
It says "it is our conclusion in summary that the grounds
for impeachment are not limited to or synonymous with crimes.
Rather we believe that acts which undermine the integrity of
government, are appropriate grounds whether or not they happen
to constitute offenses under the general criminal law. In our
view, the essential nexus to damaging the integrity of
government may be found in acts which constitute corruption in
or flagrant abuse of the powers of official position.
It may also be found in acts which, without directly
affecting governmental processes, undermine that degree of
public confidence in the probity of executive and judicial
officers that is essential to the effectiveness of government in
a free society.
Perjury and obstruction of justice, serious felony offenses
against the United States by a president, or acts of corruption
which, without doubt undermine that degree of public confidence
in the probity of the president that is essential to the
effectiveness of government in a free society. Such acts are
high crimes and misdemeanors because they inevitably subvert the
respect for law which is essential to the well-being of our
constitutional system.
A similar point is made by a contemporary commentator who has
argued, and I quote, "There are certain statutory crimes that,
if committed by public officials, reflect such lapses of
judgment, such disregard for the welfare of the state, and such
lack of respect for the law and the office the held by the
occupants, that the occupants may be impeached and removed for
lacking the minimal level of integrity and judgment sufficient
to discharge the responsibilities of office.
Such a lack of the minimal level of integrity
necessary for the proper discharge of the duties of the
presidency is evidence by the commission of the statutory crimes
of perjury and obstruction of justice. Contrary to the claim
that has been made by some, the issue before the Senate is not
whether the offenses of this president will destroy our
Constitution. We all know that our system of government will
not come tumbling down because of the corrupt conduct of William
Jefferson Clinton.
Our republic will survive the crimes of this president -- no
one doubts that. Of course, the same could be said of all the
other federal officials who have been impeached and removed from
office. And the same might be said of the crimes, serious as
they were, of President Richard Nixon.
But the removal power is not restricted to offenses
that would directly destroy our Constitution or system of
government. The removal power is not so limited that it can be
brought into play only when the immediate destruction of our
institutions is threatened.
On the contrary, the removal power should be understood as a
positive grant of authority to the Senate to preserve, protect
and strengthen our constitutional system against the misconduct
of federal officials when that misconduct would subvert,
undermine or weaken the institutions of our government. It is a
power that has the positive purpose of maintaining the health
and well-being of our system of government.
This power -- the awesome power of removal vested in the
Senate -- carries with it an awesome responsibility. This power
imposes on the Senate the responsibility to exercise its
judgment in establishing the standards of conduct that are
necessary to preserve, protect and strengthen the Constitution,
which has served the people of the United States so well for
more than two centuries.
Thus, the crucial issue before the Senate is what
standard will be set for the conduct of the president of the
United States? In this case, the Senate necessarily will
establish such a standard. And make no mistake about it: the
choice the Senate makes in this case will have consequences
reverberating far into the future of our republic.
Will a president who has committed serious offenses against
the system of justice be called to account for his crimes, or
will his offenses be regarded as of no constitutional
consequence?
Will a standard be established that such crimes by a
president will not be tolerated, or will the standard be that --
at least in some cases --a president may remain in office with
all his infamy after lying under oath and obstructing justice?
Regardless of the choice the Senate makes -- whether it
acquits or convicts the president -- a standard will be
established, and that standard will become an important part of
our constitutional law of this nation.
The institutions of our government will either be
strengthened or weakened as a result. And if the Senate acquits
this president, the conduct of future presidents will inevitably
be affected in ways that we can not now confidently predict.
I would now like to take a very few minutes to examine some
of the other specific arguments that have been made that it is
not now a proper case before the Senate for the use of the
removal power.
Some have suggested that in setting a standard in this case,
the Senate should be guided by the popularity of the president.
It is urged that a popular president, regardless of the offenses
he may have committed, should not be removed from office. Such
a view finds no support, however, in our Constitution.
On the contrary, the framers understood that a popular
president might be guilty of crimes requiring his removal from
office. That's why they included the power of impeachment
removal in the Constitution.
And that is no doubt why they specifically provided
that an impeached official who was convicted and removed might
also be perpetually disqualified to hold and enjoy any office or
honor, trust or profit under the United States.
The potential threat posed to our institutions by
presidential misconduct would in fact be heightened by the
popularity of the offending president. The harmful influence in
example of a popular president would pose a far greater danger
to the well being of our government than the influence and
example of an unpopular president.
Moreover, the very framework of our Constitution establishing
a representative democracy is at odds with the notion that the
institutions of our government should respond mechanically to
the changing tides of public opinion.
The Senate, in particular, was designed to act on the basis
of the long term best interests of the nation rather than short
term political considerations. When he was tried by the Senate
130 years ago, President Andrew Johnson was overwhelmingly
unpopular.
If the Senate had used presidential popularity as a
guide in the Johnson case, there is no doubt that he would have
been convicted and removed from office.
Yet today there is widespread agreement that such action by
the Senate would have been an abuse of the constitutional
process and those who refuse to use presidential popularity as
their guide are hailed as great statesmen and heroes.
Those senators who then stood against the tide of public
sentiment today are revered as champions of constitutional
government.
A popular president guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors
should no more remain in office than an unpopular president
innocent or wrongdoing should be removed from office.
Under the standards of the Constitution, popularity is not a
sufficient guide.
Nor should the Senate be swayed by the claims that setting a
standard adverse to this president will weaken the institution
of the presidency.
Describing the role of impeachment under our Constitution,
Arthur M. Schlesinger. Jr., -- who I will candidly admit takes
a different view of the matter today -- wisely observed the
genius of impeachment lay in the fact that it could punish the
man without punishing the office."
For, in the presidency, as elsewhere, power was
ambiguous. The power to do good meant also the power to do
harm. The power to serve the republic also the power to demean
and defile it."
Rather than weakening the presidency, the removal from office
of a president who violated his constitutional duty and oath of
office will re-establish the integrity of the presidency.
Setting a standard against the acts of perjury and obstruction
of justice committed by President Clinton will reaffirm the
dignity and honor of the office of chief executive under our
Constitution. That will strengthen -- not weaken -- the
institution of the presidency.
It has even been argued that the impeachment and removal of
President Clinton would result in the virtual alteration of our
system of government. It is contended that following the
constitutional process in this case would move us toward a
transformation of our Constitution; a quasi- parliamentary
system, with the president serving at the pleasure of the
legislative branch, would replace the framework based on the
separation of powers.
I am frankly reluctant to dignify this argument by
responding to it. President Nixon was driven from office for
his crimes under threat of impeachment and removal. The
disruption of the framework of our government did not ensue.
President Clinton may be removed from office for his crimes.
The constitutional system will remain sound.
Who has so little confidence in the durability of the
institutions of our government that he would allow a president
guilty of perjury and obstruction of justice to remain in office
simply on the basis of a fanciful and irrational fear of the
supposed consequences of his removal?
The Constitution contains wise safeguards against the misuse
of the impeachment and removal power.
As a practical matter, as we all know, the
requirement of a two-thirds vote for conviction virtually
ensures that the president will only be removed when a
compelling case for removal has been made.
And the periodic accountability to the people of members of
both the House and Senate serves as a check on the improvident
use of the impeachment power for unworthy or insubstantial
reasons. Those who would abuse the power of impeachment and
removal will be deterred by the certain knowledge that they
ultimately must answer to the people.
But of course the ultimate safeguard against the abuse of
this power is in the sober deliberation and sound judgment of
the Senate itself. The framers of the constitution vested the
removal power and responsibility in the Senate because, as
Hamilton observed, they thought the senate the most fit
depository of this important trust. The Senate was, in the view
of the framers, uniquely qualified to exercise the awful
discretion which a court of impeachment must necessarily have.
As Hamilton explained, "Where else than in the Senate, could
have been found a tribunal sufficiently dignified or
sufficiently independent?
"What other body would be likely to feel confidence
enough in its own situation to preserve unought (ph) and
uninfluenced the necessary impartiality between an individual
accused and the representatives of the people, his accusers."
Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, this is the great trust
which the Constitution has reposed in you. It is a trust you
exercise not only for those who elected you, but for all other
Americans including generations yet unborn.
As you carry out this trust, we do not suggest that you hold
this president or any president to a standard of perfection. We
do not assert that this president or any president be called to
account before the Senate for his personal failings or his sins.
We will leave the president's sins to his family and to God.
Nor do we suggest that this president or any president should
be removed from office for offenses that are not serious and
grave.
But we do submit that when this president or any
president has committed serious offenses against the system of
justice, offenses involving the stubborn and calculated choice
to place personal interest ahead of the public interest, he must
not be allowed to act with impunity.
Mr. Manager Graham has reviewed the recent precedents of the
Senate establishing the offenses such as those committed by this
president are grounds for removal from office. Those
precedents, which were set in the impeachment trials of federal
judges, are rejected as totally irrelevant by the president's
lawyers. They urge that a lower standard of integrity be
established in this case for the president of the United States
than the standard which the Senate has already established for
federal judges.
But the Constitution contains a single standard for the
exercise of the impeachment and removal power. You've heard it
before, but I will repeat, Article II, section 4 provides, "The
president, vice president, and all civil officers of the United
States shall be removed from office on impeachment for and
conviction of treason, bribery or other high crimes and
misdemeanors."
And there is nothing in the Constitution suggesting
that criminal offenses which constitute high crimes and
misdemeanors if committed by one federal official, will not be
high crimes and misdemeanors if committed by another federal
official.
There is nothing in the Constitution to suggest that the
president should be especially insulated from the just
consequences of his criminal conduct.
Just as Joseph Story warned long ago against "countenancing
so absolute a despotism of opinion in practice which might make
that a crime at one time or in one person, which would be deemed
innocent at another time or in another person."
The Senate should heed the warming of Justice Story and
refuse to arbitrarily establish a different standard for judging
William Jefferson Clinton than the standard it has imposed
already on others brought before the bar of the Senate sitting
as a court of impeachment.
The Senate has never accepted the view that a
separate standard applies to the impeachment and removal of
federal judges. Indeed, the Senate has specifically rejected
attempts to establish such a separate standard for judicial
officers. Every judge who has been impeached and removed from
office has been found guilty of treason, bribery or other high
crimes and misdemeanors.
Contrary to the argument advanced by some, the constitutional
provision that judges shall hold their offices during good
behavior does not establish any authority to remove a judge for
misconduct other than for those offenses involving treason,
bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors.
Rather than establishing a standard for removal, the good
behavior clause simply provides for a life tenure for all
Article III judges. To accept the good behavior clause, I would
caution you to accept it as a separate basis for the removal of
federal judges would pose a serious threat to the independence
of the judiciary under our Constitution.
Members of the Senate, the integrity of the administration of
justice depends not only on the integrity of judges, but also on
the integrity of the president.
A president who has committed perjury and obstruction
of justice is hardly fit to oversee the enforcement of the laws
of the United States. As professor Jonathan Turley has pointed
out, and I quote, "As chief executive, the president stands as
the ultimate authority over the justice department and the
administration's enforcement policies. It is unclear how
prosecutors can legitimately threaten, let alone prosecute,
citizens who have committed perjury or obstruction of justice
under circumstances virtually identical to the president's.
Such inherent conflict will be even greater in the military
cases in the president's role as commander in chief."
It would indeed be anomalous for the senate to now hold the
president of the United States to a lower standard of integrity
than the standard applied to members of the judiciary. There is
no sensible constitutional rationale for such a lower standard.
Who could successfully defend the view that in the
framework established by our Constitution, the integrity of the
chief executive is of less importance than the integrity of any
one of the hundreds of federal judicial officers?
It is the president who appoints justices of the Supreme
Court and all other federal judges. It is the president who
appoints the attorney general. It is the president who appoints
the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the
president who has the unreviewable power to grant pardons.
The power of the president under our Constitution far
surpasses the power of any other individual under our
Constitution. The authority and discretion vested in him under
the Constitution and laws is great and wide-ranging. The
requirement that he act with integrity and that he be a person
of integrity is essential to the integrity of our system of
government.
Soon after the adoption of the Constitution, Alexander
Hamilton wrote that "An inviolable respect for the Constitution
and laws is the most sacred duty and the greatest source of
security in a republic."
Hamilton understood that respect for the
Constitution itself grows out of a general respect for the law,
and he understood the essential connection between respect for
law and the maintenance of liberty in a republic.
Without respect for the law, the foundation of our
Constitution is not secure. Without respect for the law, our
freedom is at risk. Thus, according to Hamilton, those who set
examples which undermine or subvert the authority of the laws
lead us from freedom to slavery. Early in our own century, a
century which is soon coming to its end, Justice Brandeis spoke
of the harm to our system of government which occurs when
officials of the government act in a lawless manner.
Justice Brandeis said "Decency, security and liberty alive
demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same
rules of conduct that are commands to the citizens.
In a government of laws existence of the government
will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously.
Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For
good or ill it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime
is contagious. If the government becomes a law breaker, it
breeds contempt for law. It invites every man to become a law
unto himself. It invites anarchy."
To conclude, I would observe that in the case before it now,
the Senate must decide if William Jefferson Clinton as president
will be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands
to the citizens.
It is no answer that he may one day after leaving office
perhaps be called to account in a criminal court proceeding
somewhere. Justice delayed is justice denied.
Because he has taken and violated the oath as president,
William Jefferson Clinton is answerable for his crimes to the
Senate, here and now.
Will he, as president, be vindicated by the senate in
the face of crimes for which other citizens are adjudicated
felons and sent to prison? Or will this senate, acting in
accordance with the provisions of the constitution, bring him as
president into submission to the commands of the law? Will the
senate give force to the constitutional provision for
impeachment and removal which Justice Storry (ph) said compels
the chief magistrate as well as the humblest citizen to bend to
the majesty of the laws?
For good or for ill, William Jefferson Clinton, teaches the
whole people by his example as president. That is an undeniable
fact. The president is not only the head of government but also
the head of state. As president he has a unique ability to
command the attention of the whole nation. In his words and in
his deeds, he represents the American people and our system of
government in a way that no other American can. Great honor and
respect accrue to him by virtue of the high office he holds.
The influence of his example is far reaching and
profound.
By his conduct, President William Jefferson Clinton has set
an example this Senate cannot ignore. By his example, he has
set a dangerous and subversive standard of conduct. His
calculated and stubbornly persistent misconduct while serving as
president of the United States has set a pernicious example of
lawlessness, an example which by its very nature subverts
respect for the law. His perverse example has the inevitable
effect of undermining the integrity of both the office of
president and the administration of justice.
Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I humbly submit to you
that this harmful example, this harmful example as president,
must not stand. The maintenance in office of a president guilty
of perjury and obstruction of justice is inconsistent with the
maintenance of the rule of law.
In light of the historic purpose of impeachment, the
offenses charged against the president demand that the Senate
convict and remove him. He must not remain in office with all
his infamy.
Our Constitution requires that this president who has shown
such disrespect for the truth, such disrespect for the law, and
such disrespect for the dignity of his high office be brought to
justice for his high crimes and misdemeanors. Thank you.
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