Ms SOWADA - Thank you for the opportunity to speak today on this important question of the appointment and dismissal of the head of state. We have heard a number of proposals over the last day or so. I think we are starting to whittle them down to some workable ideas. I hope that we can reach a consensus at the end of the day on the best possible model for an Australian republic.

The Australian Republican Movement support the option of appointing the head of state by a two-thirds majority of the parliament. This proposal has been further developed by Working Group C. A number of speakers have elaborated in some detail on the merits of this proposal, so I will not labour the point again. However, I will say this: it is one of the safest methods for ensuring that the position of president retains the same powers enjoyed and exercised by the present position of Governor-General. It creates an open and transparent process whereby the parliament, the representatives of the people, make a considered and bipartisan decision.

Contrary to what some have already said, the two-thirds parliamentary appointment model will not result in a US Senate-style scrutiny of potential candidates. The Prime Minister would make one nomination to the parliament, which would undoubtedly have the support of the opposition to guarantee success. The level of debate about potential candidates would be no greater than the current scrutiny of potential High Court judges and potential governors-general. Certainly we could expect much less public debate and scrutiny than an election for archbishop in the Anglican Church.

We had three working groups discuss and consider the option of direct election. I oppose this model, not because I want to shore up the power of politicians but because I believe a direct election is unworkable and unwise within the Australian context. Despite our best efforts, a direct election would have the outcome that those who are fed up with politicians would dread - a politician would certainly end up in the job. The Irish presidential system is often held up as a model for direct election here. It should be noted in the words of the RAC report that, `Every candidate nominated since 1938 could be said to belong to the political elite in so far as each had previously either sought election or been appointed to the Irish parliament.'

Phil Cleary in his election campaign speech the other day highlighted the candidacy of former Irish President Mary Robinson. Most agree she was an outstanding president, but she was a member of the Irish Senate for 20 years prior to her election. What is more, according to the RAC report, she was approached to run by the Irish Labour Party. Surely this outcome would be an anathema to those here and in the wider community who support the cause of direct election.

As in the American system, election campaigns would become the domains of political parties and those with money who could afford to run. It would ensure that with a popular base of support, the office of president would come to rival that of the Prime Minister's. In time, with political parties involved, the campaigns themselves would inevitably become politicised.

Is this what the Australian people want? It is for them to decide ultimately, but such an outcome is at odds with a general desire to depoliticise the process. Under such a circumstance, without complete codification of the reserve powers of the head of state, direct election is at odds with our system of government. It is probably unfortunate that the term `president' has been used in this debate because it is, in the minds of many, synonymous with the American political system. I have no problem with retaining the term `Governor-General', particularly if in an Australian republic state governors retain their own title.

But the American system of direct presidential election is one with which most Australians are familiar. American elections receive wide media coverage to be sure they are unique events. I had the privilege of attending the Democratic Party National Convention in Chicago last year. There is surely no greater spectacle or celebration of democracy at work, but we should not let a superficial understanding of the American system delude us into believing that this model is right for Australia. Their system of government is very different from ours, as the president occupies a different role as both head of state and head of government. However, this does not mean that this option should not be put on the table here and examined, particularly as a large number of Australians find it attractive.

What we need to have is a proper model for debate. Working Group F has made a serious attempt to do so, but neither of the reports from the direct election of Working Group A, of which I was a member, and Working Group B discuss the method that might be used to dismiss the head of state. Neither report addresses the question of how the election process might produce a result.

Firstly, the direct election supporters have to address the question of how the process will not deliver a politician or an ex-politician without a punitive exclusion clause. Secondly, we have to ask the question whether it is fair to include such a provision at all. Is it fair to exclude politicians or ex-politicians from the process, in the same way that section 44 of the Constitution currently excludes public servants - a provision that many people feel is manifestly unfair? I hope that the groups considering further constitutional change might address this. An exclusion clause for politicians or ex-politicians would be at odds with the general desire to have a preamble reflecting Australian values of equity and a fair go.

A journalist covering this Convention has already highlighted a paradox of what people say they want and what Australians vote for. A large number of ex-politicians put themselves up for election to this Convention, including me. People have the option of not voting for those candidates. But the reality is that they were supported in large numbers. How many of the elected delegates here are former state or federal MPs currently serving or former members of local government? I counted at least 27 at a quick glance.

So how do we move forward? How do we reach agreement on a model which embraces the aspirations of Australians to have their say in selecting a head of state without creating a fundamental power shift in the Australian model of government? Perhaps we should look at a process of public consultation and nomination which might produce a name worthy of support by a two-thirds majority, or a 75 per cent majority, of a joint sitting.

The method of dismissal could be in accordance with the McGarvie model, and certainly this latter suggestion of dealing with the dismissal process is very attractive to many delegates. I note that Working Group C decided against this idea, but I would like to place it on the table again at this forum.

How might the nomination process work? Nominations could be made to a specially constituted, bipartisan parliamentary committee, with representatives drawn from the states, to sift through the nominations made by the public. Such a council has already been floated by Working Group C. Nominations could be made in the form of a petition, with a minimum number of signatures, say, 50 or 100, or it might be proper to take single nominations from individual members of the public. It would then be the task of the committee to examine these nominations to arrive at a short list for consideration by the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition.

There would be no public hearings or official investigations of candidates, thus avoiding the US style ratification system, which I believe most delegates would find unsupportable. A single nomination would then be moved by the Prime Minister and seconded by the Leader of the Opposition at a joint sitting.

I urge delegates to consider this as an additional model for appointment and dismissal. It allows for an element of public participation; it allows for a selection of a head of state which will not fundamentally alter the powers of that office; and it provides for a non-political method of dismissal.

At the end of the day, all republicans present at this Convention may have to accept 60 per cent of something rather than 100 per cent of nothing. There is a range of views represented here, and we must earnestly seek the option which best fits our current system. The process of direct election of head of state does not. The two-thirds parliamentary appointment model, proposed by Working Group C, amended to include a process of public consultation, might be the way forward we have all been looking for.

Ms KIRK - Mr Chairman, delegates: this Constitutional Convention presents a unique and exciting challenge to those delegates who wish to see Australia move from a constitutional monarchy to a republic. There is an opportunity to develop a republican model which will not only divest the British monarch of the executive power of the Commonwealth but serve this nation for the new century and beyond.

As a constitutional lawyer, I am honoured to be participating in what is undoubtedly the most important event in our constitutional history since Federation. In developing a republican constitution, we must ensure not only that the strengths of the present system are reproduced but also that we improve upon and enhance existing arrangements. I am confident that, at the end of this Convention, we will have developed a republican model which will be embraced by the Australian people at a referendum.

My remarks today will be limited to the method of dismissal of the head of state under a new republican constitution. I would first like to acknowledge a number of eminent constitutional lawyers who have assisted me enormously in the development of these ideas. The work of Professor George Winterton and the Hon. Richard McGarvie, and the eloquent addresses of Professor Greg Craven at this Convention have been most helpful to me. History will no doubt recognise the great contribution they have made to the debate.

The strength of our present system is that it provides for a stable and secure democracy. The Governor-General is vested with many significant powers under the Australian Constitution, including the power to appoint and dismiss a Prime Minister and to summon and dissolve parliament. In practice, these powers have been uncontroversial because their exercise is tightly constrained by constitutional convention. This requires that the powers are exercised only on the advice of the ministers of the elected government. The conventions are not rules of law and are not enforceable in the courts. The sanction for a breach of the convention that the Governor-General acts on advice is dismissal by the Queen on the advice of the Prime Minister.

If the powers of the head of state in a republic are to be substantially the same as under existing arrangements, then there must be an effective procedure to dismiss a head of state who acts without, or contrary to, advice.

While a great deal of time and energy at this Convention has been devoted to discussion of the various methods of appointment of the head of state, a lot less attention has been paid to the important question of how that head of state is to be removed. It is often assumed, for no apparent reason, that the method of removal of the head of state must mirror that of appointment. For example, the Keating model provided for appointment and removal of a head of state by a two-thirds majority of a joint sitting of parliament. This has been the preferred model of dismissal of a head of state of the Australian Republican Movement. However, most people have recognised that this is most unlikely to be effective to remove a head of state as no federal government for 50 years has had a two-thirds majority and it is political practice in Australia for oppositions to vote against governments. It is even less likely that a motion to remove a head of state would be supported in circumstances in which he or she is acting contrary to the government's interest.

There has been very little discussion by those who support a popular election of a head of state as to how that head of state would be removed. If the method of removal were to mirror that of appointment, then a referendum of the people would be required. Apart from the delay that this would involve, referendum, if it were to be similar to the process in section 128 it would first require the passage of legislation through both houses of parliament. Such legislation would be most unlikely to pass in the event that the government faced a hostile Senate which supported the actions of the head of state.

If the method of removal of the head of state is by either a special majority at a joint sitting of parliament or by the people, the head of state may be, effectively, undismissible in circumstances in which he or she refuses to act on government advice. The extensive powers exercised by the Governor-General now could, if transferred to a republican head of state who is effectively undismissible, lead to obstruction and frequent constitutional crisis. A head of state elected by the people could decide that he or she is bound to act contrary to advice in circumstances where he or she perceives it to be against the interests of the people: for example, by refusing to assent to legislation.

It is for this reason that there must be a mechanism in a republican Constitution to ensure the prompt dismissal of a head of state who acts to obstruct or collude with a government to subvert the democratic process. In his most eloquent address yesterday in the chamber, Professor Craven outlined the three republican models that he believes should be seriously considered by delegates in their deliberations. These are the McGarvie model, the ARM's preferred model and the so-called hybrid model of appointment.

The republican model proposed by former Governor of Victoria Richard McGarvie has been outlined by him in the chamber here and has been discussed by many other delegates at this Convention. It is the method of dismissal of a head of state to which I will direct my comments in relation to this model. Under the McGarvie model, the Constitutional Council is bound to act on the Prime Minister's advice to appoint or dismiss a head of state. The sanction for failure to act within 14 days of receipt of the advice is automatic dismissal of the members of the council.

The advantage of the McGarvie model is that it takes the vital power of dismissal of a head of state out of the hands of a foreign monarch with little knowledge of Australian politics and gives it to a body comprised of Australians with recent experience in these matters. With respect, the disadvantage of the model is that it provides little more than a rubber stamp of the Prime Minister's decision to appoint - and, more significantly, to dismiss - a head of state. Although the Constitutional Council can provide advice and counsel to the Prime Minister, it must act on advice or face instant dismissal. This model gives exceptional power to a Prime Minister who seeks dismissal of a head of state for inappropriate, if not unconstitutional, reasons. As Professor George Winterton has observed, the model gives exceptional power to a Prime Minister who seeks dismissal of a head of state who warns of an intention to exercise reserve powers. This is not unlike existing arrangements if it is the case that the Queen would consider herself bound to act on the advice of the Prime Minister to dismiss. However, unlike the council, the monarch is not subject to dismissal should she exercise her recognised prerogative right to refuse to act on the advice of the Prime Minister to dismiss a Governor-General.

I will now turn to the Australian Republican Movement's model. The Australian Republican Movement has recognised the weaknesses in a method of removal of a head of state which requires a two-thirds majority of a joint sitting of federal parliament. Our preferred method of removal of a head of state is by simple majority of the House of Representatives. We believe that this model promotes prime ministerial government without jeopardising the position of a head of state who warns of an intention to exercise reserve powers. A head of state who acted contrary to advice would be advised of the Prime Minister's intention to recommend a motion to the House to remove him or her.

Under this model there would be need to provision to prevent a head of state from acting to dismiss a Prime Minister or a government who warned of an intention to dismiss the head of state. For example, there may be a provision to suspend the reserve powers of the head of state pending dismissal in the House of Representatives and/or a removal of the existing power of the Governor-General to prorogue parliament. Under this model, in circumstances where a head of state warns of an intention to exercise the reserve powers as occurred in 1975, dismissal of the president by the Prime Minister alone could not be effected to prevent the exercise of the reserve powers, as is the case under the existing arrangements and also the McGarvie model. The parliament would have the opportunity to hear the reasons for the dismissal of the head of state and the Australian people could make their judgment as to its appropriateness at the next election. (Extension of time granted)

The third option suggested by Professor Craven yesterday is the hybrid model. This provides for appointment by two-thirds majority of a joint sitting and removal by the Constitutional Council. There is no logical reason why appointment and dismissal of a head of state need be by the same or similar body or method. In fact, there is an argument that the body that appoints should not remove a head of state.

Under the McGarvie model, it is conceivable that the Constitutional Council could appoint a head of state who refuses to act in accordance with government advice and who must therefore be removed by it. If this were to occur shortly after the head of state's appointment, the same men and woman would be involved in the decision to remove.

Delegates may be persuaded to consider limiting the role of the Constitutional Council to providing advice to the Prime Minister before a decision is made by the parliament to remove a head of state. If this model were adopted, the council would be limited to act only in times of constitutional crisis. This is a variation on what Professor Craven suggested yesterday. The council would not make the decision to dismiss; it would merely provide advice to the Prime Minister before a decision was made by the parliament - the House of Representatives - by simple majority to dismiss a president. This would promote prime ministerial government and the supremacy of parliament.

The knowledge and skills of the members of the Constitutional Council, being former governors-general, governors and justices, would be applied to provide counsel and guidance to a Prime Minister in delicate and difficult circumstances. Under this model, the council would not be involved in the decision as to who should be chosen as head of state. This should meet the criticisms of many delegates that the council would be an unrepresentative - even elitist - body. Its composition would not be of such significance if its role were limited to counsel and guidance in the decision by the parliament to dismiss a head of state. Delegates may even consider widening the role of the council to include a power to advise a head of state who was considering an exercise of the reserve powers. The Constitutional Council would be likely to be seen by the public as an impartial umpire due to its constitution and automatic selection.

May I conclude by saying that there is room for creativity in the design of a model which will replace the existing system with procedures that are uniquely Australian. I urge delegates to take up this challenge.

Mr GREEN - If what we have seen in the newspapers over the last few days can be believed, and if what we have heard being said in the chamber can also be believed, then the spiritual road to Damascus is extremely busy. There is traffic congestion. We have people moving up, people coming back, people moving on to Baghdad and people moving down to the Dead Sea. I think we all need to consider whether or not we are going to take this journey down the road to Damascus. If we do, once we start we should not look back.

During the election campaign in Tasmania, the question often put to me by republicans and others was which model did I favour. The choice put to me was the direct election of the president or a parliamentary election. Not to disregard the views of such people, I stated that I have always believed in the parliamentary process and in the appointment and dismissal of the president. This view is consistent with the position of the ARM. But, importantly, I stated that it would be interesting for the case for direct election to be fully explored at the Convention and that options should not be closed off.

The case for direct election needs to be judged on its merits, as with any other case, including the case for the status quo. The issue of direct election creates problems, and I need not go through them as they have already been dealt with by speakers. However, at present there is insufficient detail coming from the advocates of direct election to persuade me that that is the preferred model at this stage.

The Convention now I think is getting back on track and it is hoped that all the recommendations from the working groups can be proceeded with. As mentioned, of the three models I prefer, the option advanced by Working Group C is preferred. The McGarvie model certainly is attractive. I want to thank the Hon. Richard McGarvie for forwarding to me his proposal, along with accompanying correspondence. I am of the opinion that the opportunity to advance Australia to a republic should not be lost because of some blind and uncompromising commitment to a preferred model.

As I said, the McGarvie model is attractive, but there are problems I see with a triumvirate assuming the role of Her Majesty in the appointment of the head of state. Unfortunately judges do not always get it right, and the hierarchy of courts I think demonstrates that. Indeed, governors-general and governors do not always get it right. The triumvirate is not necessarily a bad idea, but perhaps it could be more broadly based as regards skills and qualifications. The McGarvie model is certainly workable and should not be lost if at the end of the day an impasse is to be created as to which preferred model of republicanism in Australia is to advance.

Preferred models can be adopted with modification if such modifications are constitutionally sound, workable, have public endorsement and do not remove the role of the states or territories. I contend that, whatever republican model is adopted, public involvement is essential to keep faith with the people and to give the public some participatory role. Involvement of the states, I stress, is also essential. Working Group C involves the federal parliament and therefore involves the states and territories through their elected representatives. Over the years, the states have struggled to have a voice in consideration of treaties that the federal government proposes to enter into which affect the states. The states have struggled to be consulted about High Court appointments. Surely there should be a mechanism to involve the states in the important question of who is to be the head of state.

An advance on the Working Group C proposal by some consideration of public involvement and particularly involvement of the state and territory parliaments seems to me desirable. Indeed, such a method or process could also be considered in relation to expanding the model advanced by Richard McGarvie. The position of the states and territories needs to be considered. It is important that the states are carried by this Convention in determining a preferred model if the status quo is not to prevail. Recommendations for the working groups should go forward.

Ms MARY KELLY - As you know, I support and give preference to full codification and popular election as a package. But I want to pick up on a thread that runs through all of our debates. For me, the thread which connects the powers question to the election and appointment question is the Australian people's alienation from the political process. It is also a thread that, if teased out, drives us all in a certain direction on the appointment and dismissal question.

How did the idea of popular election take hold in the community? For a while I found it puzzling. Where did this longing come from? It is not as though people already had a direct say in the Governor-General now or even that they were overwhelmed with love for that position. Many people are barely aware of it. No, it is because we were offered two choices. Who should choose the head of state: two-thirds of parliament or all citizens? That was no contest out there. People did not trust their own elected representatives to choose for them. In fact, they actively opposed it on the grounds that those representatives would just pick someone like themselves, a politician.

People's alienation from their representatives has been noticeable for about a decade and has been increasing over that period. This alienation has increased their sense of aloneness and vulnerability. They feel without a champion or protector, and troubled economic times has fuelled and reinforced that feeling. No wonder they want to reinvent a champion and protector in the position of the head of state.

This is a state of affairs that worries me deeply. I want to make it clear that I do not want to capitalise on people's dislike for politicians; I want to reverse it. I see it as part of a broader social malaise which I call the slow death of active citizenship. I have spent most of my life trying to reverse that - for 10 years as a high school teacher getting students to engage in citizenship activities and civic duties, for 10 years as an elected union official getting teachers around the country to engage in public policy formation both professionally and industrially, and in a different way now in my own job.

I have America in my peripheral vision where the `government as enemy' mantra has led to violence in some cases. Part of why the popular election idea has taken hold in the public mind is also because the head of state is being considered in an artificially separated way from the rest of parliament - the two houses - and this has served to iconise the role and lead people to invest all their hopes and aspirations in it. It may be that if reforms to the two houses were also on the agenda, both this one and the public agenda, people's focus on popular election would be less intense. This Convention, however, chose not to broaden the agenda. In any case it is too late, the horse has bolted and people have it in their heads. If the option is taken away from them, they will experience it as theft and their cynicism and alienation will increase, and the slow death of active citizenship will be given another boost.

I am not a populist. I am deeply distrustful of populism. For example, it would not matter to me how many polls showed people overwhelmingly supported, say, capital punishment. Nothing would make me vote for it. I think popular election with codification is the way to go, not just because people want it but because it will help to reverse the slow death of active citizenship. People's desire for popular election can be seen not just as a barrier to the perfect model but as a gift to be used for good. Accompanied by full codification, popular election could be used to reconnect people to their governance structures. There would be a ripple effect into the two houses of parliament. I believe that it would assist people to feel again part of Australia's major decision making structures. If we followed it up at the next convention or like discussion with some overdue reforms to the two houses, we would have the whole picture about right.

When the motion for full codification, which for many is part and parcel of popular election, was so briskly and brutally knocked off on day 2, I was angered. It is the sort of factional blocking behaviour which people recognise and dislike about their politicians and would have sent out a very negative message. It caused delegates like me, whose support for popular election has always been conditional, to become loud advocates of it, to get it back in the picture. From a pro-republican point of view, it was also a very high-risk strategy. I agree with Peter Beattie's assessment and that of others that the minimalist republican model is defeatable in a referendum.

In terms of nomination, I support open nomination with some sort of short-listing or filtering process, the values and criteria for which need to be explicit and the decisions non-appealable. For those who point to the reluctance of former Governors-General who have performed well to subject themselves to or nominate for such a process, I point out that the potential for greatness is widespread in our community and not confined to those who are like those who have already displayed it.

I am sure we all struggle in our own way to make the world a better place. I conceive of that struggle in inheritance terms. That is, we take the work of our forebears and build on it and hand it on to our children. Our task then becomes not just to persist in the time we are given in our efforts but to be on the lookout for those moments and turning points that come our way and to use them and not waste them. I have come to the view that people's desire for popular election is one of those gift moments and one of those opportunities for a quantum leap in reform that may not be available again for decades; and I do not want to see it wasted. In the lead-up to the new century people will be more open-minded and adventurous than in the past and that the next few years is an open moment in Australia's history. It is entirely possible, as well as desirable, that popular election with full codification could succeed in a referendum, and certainly in a multiple choice plebiscite.

Out of respect for the dialogue still to be completed, I will be voting for all pro-republican options this afternoon, that is, A, B, C, D and F, but in the knowledge that if we end up in a plebiscite debate all options return anyway.

Finally, I want to say that my pro-republican, pro-popular election and pro-codification views are not driven by worrying about who opens the Olympics. I do not care whether the flag changes and what the head of state is called. I have no objections to former politicians becoming heads of state; I just do not want anyone who becomes a head of state to have political powers to exercise. I do not really care about those symbols and trappings. What engages me is the real life of our citizens and reversing the slow death of active citizenship. The best way to do that is to combine popular election with full codification as represented in resolutions 7A and 7B from day two.

CHAIRMAN - Before I call on Dr David Flint, I remind delegates that we still have quite a long list of people to hear. Technically we should have been in the speakers from the floor section at this stage but, because we have had so many who have not spoken before, I thought it better to allow the 10-minute speeches. We are due to consider the report from the Resolutions Group at 12 o'clock. I will therefore allow 10-minute speeches until then. After Mr Clem Jones we will cut off speakers on the 10 minutes, and immediately after lunch when we resume we will go back to the speakers from the floor, which means that each speaker will have only five minutes instead of 10 minutes, which will allow more speakers to get on.

So to forewarn you, I give notice that after calling Dr David Flint I will call Mr Clem Jones, and we should then be able to receive the report from the Resolutions Group and subject to the time taken for that debate, for which we have allowed until 1 o'clock, we will adjourn for lunch. Immediately after lunch we will return and five minutes will be allowed for all subsequent speakers on the same group of issues we have been debating this morning.

Dr FLINT - Delegates, Mr Sutherland graciously gave me his place in the list, but he did ask me to draw your attention to page 141 of yesterday's Hansard in which he is reported as interjecting, `What about Keating?' Mr Sutherland asked me to tell you that he did not interject. But he did not ask me to tell you what he thinks about Mr Keating or how often he thinks about Mr Keating.

I take as my test these words from the annals of Tacitus: re publicae forma laudari facilius quam evenire; that is, it is easier to praise a republican model than to make it work. The founders of this nation made a remarkable achievement, which is recorded in Quick and Garran:

Never before have a group of self governing independent communities, without external pressure or foreign complications, deliberately chosen to come together as one people from a simple and intellectual conviction of the folly of disunion and the advantages of nationhood.

The great benefit of that constitution is that it gives us a head of state which is, above all, benign and we are here, I hope, to protect that benign head of state from becoming malignant.

Randolph Churchill once underwent an operation for a suspected cancer. Mostly they found that it was benign, about which Evelyn Waugh mischievously observed:

Such are the wonders of British medicine that when they opened up dear Randolph, they found the only part of him that is not malignant.

Delegates, let us open the republican models and, perhaps with Tacitus, we may praise them but we should ask, do they work? Apart from the direct election model, we have two models which Mr Paddy McGuinness describes as the `stuffed shirt' models. So we have the two stuffed shirt models.

The method of appointment in the Keating version has been well debated here but it lacks, as we know, the informality and speed of our present constitution, although I must say I doubt the proposition made yesterday that Her Majesty would act on the telephone call; certainly she would not after that Quebecois disc jockey telephoned her live on radio posing as the Canadian Prime Minister.

While the two-thirds vote may provide a stuffed shirt, there is no guarantee that it will provide a virtuous stuffed shirt. The new President of Pakistan, elected in the last few weeks, is not the sort of president that you or I would wish. He will be obviously the Prime Minister's man. The new President did not obtain a two-thirds majority; he obtained a majority in the parliamentary college of 78 per cent, and he is no virtuous stuffed shirt.

The method of appointment proposed in the Keating model would send shivers down the backs of the American founding fathers. As Hamilton argued, there must be no connection between the President and the Congress. If the President is to be fearless in his treatment of Congress, he must not owe his election to them.

But the fundamental weakness of the Keating model is the same as the ARM pointed out in relation to direct election - it desperately needs codification. A two-thirds election is a two-thirds vote and a two-thirds majority is the mother of all mandates. As Bill Hayden says, the president is capable of turning out not only as a first-rate nuisance but worse. What the Keating model will result in is something akin to the French 5th republic, where there is a permanent tension between the Elysee Palace and the Hotel Matignon.

Why should we follow France in 200 years? She has had 16 constitutions, five republics, three monarchies, two empires and a number of revolutionary and dictatorial regimes. The sanction in Westminster is in the dismissal. As Hardin says about parliamentary Westminster systems, they can `quickly, expeditiously and legitimately replace leaders who have been found inadequate for the occasion'. That is the virtue of Westminster. History tells us that any attempt to graft a republic onto Westminster invariably results in an inferior model.

Does the model proposed by the eloquent Mr McGarvie provide the solution? Let us look at dismissal. Will the judges on the Constitutional Council require that natural justice be given to the president and that the president must have notice that the grounds, the breaches of the Convention which have occurred, are set out in the notice of dismissal? Will the judges on the Constitutional Council ask for proof of the conventions? Have the conventions carried over into the republic? One problem which Mr Evan Whitton points out is that sometimes judges have a strange view of the world. He says that there is something in the common law water perhaps. Others say that perhaps former judges and governors may suffer from limelight deprivation and they may need to prolong the proceedings.

What is the problem? Is there a problem if these models produce delay and instability in the time that a dismissal is proposed and a dismissal is realised? In 1975 the situation was very different. In 1975 Australia was a closed economy. Things are different now. We are a global economy. The judges of what happens in Australia are Messrs Standard and Poor and Moody's, and they are tougher than Texan judges. The decision and the execution will follow very quickly if we are having an unstable period of government. It will be the economy and employment and the dollar which will suffer.

Juan Linz, in his review of East European attempts to establish legitimate democracies, says that crises in Westminster systems are crises of government. Crises in presidential systems are more likely than not to be crises of regimes. Does this mean that we will have a first republic and a second republic? Will we be like our neighbour, Fiji, which had a bicultural monarchy, moved to a racist republic and is in the process of moving back to a bicultural monarchy?

The worst problem, I fear, with Mr McGarvie's model is the danger of political capture. You have all heard of regulatory capture; this is political capture. The example is Sweden. In Sweden in 1974, it was decided to hand the king's reserve powers to the Speaker. The Speaker before that was a position seen to be above the political battle.

Immediately after 1974, the Convention about the election of the Speaker was torn up. It became a political prize. That is the danger - that, once it is seen that positions lead to positions of power, they will become political prizes, as we have seen in Pakistan. In Pakistan, not only has the President been a political prize but now also the Chief Justice is. The last Chief Justice was ousted a few weeks ago by the other judges because he was seen to be in opposition to the Prime Minister.

The final model is the American model, the direct election model. If the Australian people, after an informed debate, come to the conclusion that they wish to directly elect their president, they should look seriously at the American model.

What is the solution? The solution, I suspect, is in another country - another country which on every economic indicator outperforms us, which sits at the top table in the economic and political councils of the world; a country which has a Bill of Rights; a country whose people and diplomats have no difficulty in explaining to other people whom their head of state is and how the head of state is chosen. That country, of course, is Canada. As Professor Edward McWhinney, the leading Canadian international legal expert, says, anybody who pushed a republic in Canada would be dismissed as an incompetent obsessed with trivia.

CHAIRMAN - I am afraid your time has expired, Dr Flint. As we have no time for an extension, I am afraid we have run out of time. We have 10 minutes to get on to what we determined yesterday would happen at 12 noon. I am sorry.

Dr CLEM JONES - First of all, I thank you, Mr Chairman, for your indulgence in allowing me to speak at this time. I intended to speak yesterday afternoon and to say something which I probably would not say today. But, unfortunately, I issued my speech to the press before I came in to make it, and you, Mr Chairman, have kindly allowed me to make that speech now.

First of all, I would like to refer to a paper submitted by the Hon. Mike Rann. He said:

Most if not all of us hold strong views about the issues we are charged to discuss during the next two weeks. We would be foolish however to cling to either rigid dogma or to a fixed non-negotiable formula. To do so would be to fail the Australian people and, just as importantly, to fail the test of history. As delegates we must have open minds rather than pretend pompously to know all the answers.

On Tuesday we witnessed a situation which I found totally deplorable. We saw the very antithesis of the republican philosophy which surely guides us in our other deliberations - the philosophy espoused by Mr Rann when he said it would be foolish to cling to rigid dogmas or an affixed non-negotiable formula.

Perhaps we did not cling on Tuesday to a fixed non-negotiable dogma, but we certainly excluded one of the most vital considerations, one of the major concepts which needed to be discussed at this Convention, the most important aspect perhaps of our deliberations: fundamental to the concept of a republic is the right of people to participate in it. Where should that start? Surely at the very beginning in the determination of the nature of a republic which suits the needs and culture of our society.

On Tuesday the ARM was responsible for a situation whereby no constructive proposal for the election of a head of state by the people could be presented to either this Convention or the people of Australia. Hopefully that will be remedied, but it must be an intentional effort to remedy it and not just a postponement of the same thing.

Malcolm Turnbull may have the numbers to achieve this sort of thing in this chamber; he does not have them in the suburbs of our city in the broadacres of our nation. The people of this country will eventually tell him that. But the sad result is likely to be, as has been so well expressed by others already, that we will not have a republic, or at least a true republic, in this country perhaps for a generation to come.

Even worse, if perchance their model - or indeed any other possible model or now possible model - were accepted, there will never be a change to provide for the say of the people in the choice of their head of state. Once the power has become enshrined in the parliament, politicians will never let it go. The man who has personally been responsible for this, the man who seeks to espouse the cause, the man who seeks to be the father of it, Malcolm Turnbull, has become its potential destroyer. Sadly, had that man done as he promised to do - to take note of the wishes of the people and to meet them - he could have retained the title of `Father of the Republic'. Unfortunately, if the path along which he wishes us to tread is successful, I believe that he will become known as the Mother of destruction.

Mr TURNBULL - Are you proposing a sex change, Clem?

Dr CLEM JONES - I do not know, I would not have any knowledge of what happens to mothers of disaster. May I make one of two appeals. The first is to the monarchists, whose integrity of purpose one must admire. We tried to arrange to have the votes on the vital question earlier to enable them to participate in the discussions on the nature of the various other models for a republic. I again appeal to them to support this idea so that we can have input from those people who have vast experience in the government of this country, vast experience in the way this country has developed to play their part in developing these models that we have been talking about over the last few days.

I would like to make a second appeal. I am not quite sure how it can be achieved. Perhaps it should be initiated from the chair or perhaps from the Prime Minister. The plea I make is that we give some thought to the necessity perhaps of having a plebiscite following this Convention to decide which of the three models generally canvassed should go before the people so that we may let the people decide.

Let me now touch on the most hysterical red herring that Malcolm Turnbull has set swimming in the murky waters of his various presentations in opposition to having the people of Australia make a contribution to this exercise. This is his suggestion: that popular election of the president would mean greater powers for the Senate in relation to the granting of supply. May I submit that this is a total and absolute furphy. I think Professor O'Brien described it as nonsense, but he is more polite than I am.

I am not a lawyer, but I do not believe that it is beyond the capacity of those eminent in that area who are here today and perhaps elsewhere in this nation to provide in our Constitution that the head of state, among other things, should not dissolve the House of Representatives consequent upon the Senate refusing supply unless requested to do so by the House of Representatives or perhaps the Prime Minister. I do not believe that it is not possible to simply provide that in the codification that you have as necessary in the development of a republic.

I do not propose at this time to go through the proposals of the working groups except to refer quickly to the claims made that it is not possible to provide safeguards against conflict between the head of state and the Prime Minister - if the people elect the former that it is not possible to avoid political overtones of various kinds in such an election and so on. You will have noted that there has been a careful avoidance to present in this context of the Clem Jones Queensland Constitutional Republic Team codification of the proposed powers and functions of the president of the Commonwealth of Australia, widely circulated to delegates. We have made it clear that we are not dogmatic in this presentation.

After talking to people from all walks of life, we have come up with a proposal and I will read it. David Muir has already mentioned some of the proposals to you. I will quickly state the conditions which we provide for the election of a president - you will see that it covers the point that has been made so often in this chamber so far: that the candidates for president must not at the time of the issuing of writs for such an election be a member of a house of parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia nor a member of any house of parliament of any of the states or territories; that candidates for president must not at the time of issuing of writs for such an election be a member of a political party; and that the president during his or her term of office shall not be a member of a party.

This is the important one from this point of view: it will not be unlawful and cause the nomination of a candidate for the office of president to be declared invalid if during an election for such office he or she actively seeks support for or from a party or candidates contesting a concurrent election, and we provide for the election to be held at the same time as the House of Representatives election for the parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia.

It will be unlawful and cause a nomination of candidate for the Senate and House of Representatives to be declared unlawful if during an election for such office he or she actively seeks support for or from a candidate contesting the concurrent election for the office of president in the Commonwealth of Australia. I think that would conclusively deal with it if it were introduced - and it can be - into the electoral act or, where necessary, into the Constitution. We advise that there is no impediment to making that requirement of candidates for election.

I believe we are moving towards a plebiscite at this time. I think the events of the last three days have shown that we are going to have great difficulty in coming to any consensus. If the various factions should, if that is the case, move towards putting their best form of what they believe in, not the emasculated form which will come out of the working groups as they are now structured, I suggest the advancement of the idea of a plebiscite should be considered by this Convention. If we are not going - as I believe is the case - to achieve an acceptable consensus, then this would give the people of Australia the best opportunity of choosing the option which would then be presented to them in the best possible form.

I leave you with the thought that there are urgent issues of intent and integrity in the achievement of our goals still before this chamber. They urgently need to be addressed by this Convention. This means a change in direction and I urge you that we take it.

Brigadier GARLAND - Mr Chairman, I raise a point of order. During the discussions this morning there have been a number of extensions allowed to various speakers. Indeed, Delegate Mary Delahunty was not only given an extension but also got an extra minute after the extension expired in order to complete her speech. I believe that was discrimination when the vote was not even put to the floor for Dr Flint. I believe that should be remedied. I believe the remarks that he was unable to make in an extension period should be incorporated not just into the proceedings of the day but also into the Hansard.

CHAIRMAN - Thank you very much, Brigadier Garland. You should note that Dr Flint is here as a proxy, that he was allowed time as a person who had not spoken, although Sir David Smith, whose place he is taking, has already spoken on a number of occasions. For that reason, he was allowed on the agenda with 10 minutes whereas those speakers this afternoon are to be allowed only five. In the circumstances, and as we decided yesterday that at 12 o'clock we are going to consider the resolution from the resolutions committee, I believe it appropriate that we should do that.

Brigadier Garland has moved that the balance of Dr Flint's speech be incorporated in Hansard. I point out to you that that is not possible because I do not know whether Dr Flint was speaking from a written note. In any event, the basis of incorporation of material into Hansard is laid down in our rules of debate. I suspend the debate on the matter before the chair: that is, the working group reports.

In accordance with yesterday's decision, I now propose to receive the Resolutions Group proposal concerning Convention procedures and role of the Resolutions Group. This will be considered on the basis of the Attorney-General, Mr Daryl Williams, who will be presenting the report. He will be followed, if need be, by Mr Gareth Evans, within a total allocated time slot of 15 minutes. Subsequently, up to 1 o'clock, if need be, intervention from the floor will be allowed for three minutes per person. The debate will then be adjourned and the vote will be taken at 4 p.m. so that all delegates, having had this opportunity for a debate, will have an opportunity to consider the report between the time of the presentation now and the putting of the vote at 4 o'clock. If there are amendments or if there are other proposals, they will be capable of being put during the period up to 1 o'clock, but no questions themselves nor votes will be taken until 4 o'clock this afternoon. I call on Mr Daryl Williams to present the report on behalf of the Resolutions Group.

Mr WILLIAMS - The report I am presenting, an oral one, is effectively a unanimous report of the Resolutions Group. The Resolutions Group has wide ranging representation on it. I therefore anticipate and hope that the time allowed for debate on this will prove unnecessary and that the recommendations will meet with the unanimous agreement of the Convention. Let me start with highlighting that there are three separate resolutions, A, B and C, recommended. You should have had a copy circulated to you on green paper. First, I draw attention to B(2). The role of the Resolutions Group is seen by that group in the terms of paragraph B(2):

The primary responsibility of the Resolutions Group is to formulate for consideration by the Convention in its Final Plenary Sessions -

that is, on days nine and 10 -

a series of draft resolutions -

to be called `final plenary resolutions' -

which as systematically and comprehensively as practicable expose for debate and decision all those proposals which, in the judgement of the Resolutions Group, have attracted significant support amongst Convention delegates.

The resolutions in A and B address how that result might be achieved. Resolution B(3) states:

In formulating Final Plenary Resolutions the Resolutions Group shall take into account:

(a)debates that have already taken place;

(b)all those resolutions which achieve, on a counted vote or in the judgement of the Chairman, at least 25% support in plenary session; and

(c)any further amendments or proposed resolutions forwarded to the Resolutions Group by any delegate which, in the judgement of the Resolutions Group, assist it in exposing issues for Final Plenary Session debate in accordance with its obligation under Resolution (2).

That gives a fairly wide term of reference in that respect to the Resolutions Group. It will be able to have access to a wide range of material in preparing the final plenary resolutions for consideration by the Convention. But that will not be the end of it as far as the Convention is concerned because, as noted in (4), the final plenary resolutions will remain subject to additional amendments, which may even be moved from the floor during the final plenary session.

There has been some debate, and in foreshadowing this motion yesterday Gareth Evans referred expressly to the motions that have been dealt with in the first voting session being excluded if they did not achieve 50 per cent support. Resolution A(1) is designed to achieve a greater degree of flexibility there. In future plenary sessions it is recommended that on key issues all resolutions that achieve a level of support of at least 25 per cent of delegates present and voting, either on a counted vote or, in the absence of a count, in the judgment of the chairman, should be forwarded to the Resolutions Group with a view to their subject matter being further considered by the Convention.

They represent the distilled wisdom of the members of the Resolutions Group in relation to the process by which final plenary resolutions are to be developed for consideration in the final plenary session. The group has also considered what might happen at the final plenary sessions and in C, resolution 5, it is proposed to request the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, in consultation with the Resolutions Group, to bring forward a proposal for a two-stage process for the final plenary sessions, whereby in the event of no clear preference as between options emerging from the deliberations in stage 1, a further opportunity would be given in stage 2 for that preference to be expressed.

The situation that is contemplated there is that there could be a number of results in the final voting. It is contemplated that there will be models prepared of those models which achieve a modicum of support - the popular election model, the parliamentary election model, the McGarvie model and the status quo - and each of those will be considered separately. There will then be consideration, at least among the republican models, as to which is the preferred republican model.

The situation may be reached where there is no majority support for one model. It may also be the case that two models or three models achieve similar levels of support. The object of the Convention being to put a model to the government as a preferred model for a possible referendum, it would be appropriate, in the event that the first stage of voting does not achieve an identification of a preferred model, that there be a further stage of consideration with a view to seeing whether that result can be achieved. On that basis, there would need to be some appropriate procedure developed, which the Resolutions Group requests the Chairman and Deputy Chairman to consider in consultation with it.

There are two other matters. In the course of Gareth's preliminary report yesterday, mention was made of the possibility of voting on resolutions coming from working groups being sequential. The Resolutions Group proposes to request the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, in consultation with the group, to bring forward a proposal to the Convention to amend the order of proceedings to require consideration of working group resolutions in plenary sessions on days 4, 6, 7 and 8 to proceed on a sequential basis with voting on each resolution following immediately after consideration for not more than 20 minutes of that resolution. This would require amendment of the agenda and the time for debate. In the case of day 4 - namely, today - it would require the plenary debate and voting to be brought forward by one hour.

It is not suggested that that is a matter for debate by the Convention now; that is a matter for the Chairman and Deputy Chairman to consider and, if appropriate, bring a suggestion to the Convention. If there is to be action to bring forward by one hour the plenary debate and voting today, then it would be appropriate, the rapporteurs suggest, to bring forward the voting on the resolutions that are now being proposed - namely, A, B and C - by one hour.

I have dealt with A, B and C together in one report. It may be appropriate that they be separately debated if it is the wish of the Convention to debate them at any length.

CHAIRMAN - Thank you, Mr Williams. There has now been a proposal, firstly from Mr Williams's review, sequentially, of A, B and C. Do you have a question on the general part or on A, Mr Ruxton?

Mr RUXTON - I would like to ask you a question. What the Attorney-General has just put forward means that those resolutions on day 2 are now null and void; is that correct?

CHAIRMAN - No, what it means is that, as I indicated, in order to accommodate Mr Gifford's remark the other day it would be possible for the Resolutions Committee to come forward on the final day with those resolutions that have been passed. This Convention, when it considers the Resolutions Committee report, will begin with the resolutions that have been passed. Having considered the Resolutions Committee, we will look at the Resolutions Committee report as the basis for further consideration by this Convention of all those resolutions which have been put and passed. So the answer to your question is no. Until such stage as those resolutions are varied by the will of this Convention they remain resolutions, but only provisional resolutions. It has always been the basis that final resolutions will be put before the Convention on day nine.

Mr RUXTON - All I can say is that you have an Attorney-General and a former Attorney-General of different political persuasions coming up with a proposition - I have never heard of a 25 per cent majority going forward anywhere. This is real snake oil. It is snake oil by the snake charmers over there. A 25 per cent majority - and that is if it is carried. I am sorry, Sir, I find that as something of risk.

CHAIRMAN - Thank you. We will take that as an intervention to which either the Attorney-General or Mr Evans will respond in due course. Are there any further interventions, either as general comment on the whole or in particular on A, B and C?

Professor PATRICK O'BRIEN - If I heard correctly, did Daryl Williams say that the vote will be put forward to 3 o'clock this afternoon?

CHAIRMAN - I was going to come to that in a moment. We cannot put a vote until we have taken a vote. The time allocated for voting is 4 o'clock. I am afraid it is not possible for us to advance that vote because we have already decided, under our order of proceedings, that there will be no vote taken until 4 p.m. So the request with regard to day four is not capable of being considered because of the earlier decision.

Professor PATRICK O'BRIEN - I believe that we should stick to whatever timetable was announced in today's sheet simply because it is possible that delegates may have made arrangements on that basis. I do not think we should jump around with the times, because it just creates total uncertainty. We should stick to what was circulated this morning.

Mr GARETH EVANS - Whatever may be the merits of dealing with it earlier rather than later, just on the process: is it not possible for the Convention at any stage to move that so much of standing orders be suspended as would enable the Convention to do something different from that which is in its standing orders? It is really quite absurd to be locked in if there is a mood to do something that we all want to do.

CHAIRMAN - Regrettably, we agreed to an order of proceedings and I would uphold the point that Professor O'Brien made that we agreed that there would be no votes before 4 p.m. Therefore, while you can move it, there can be no vote taken on that suspension of standing orders relating to 4 p.m.

Mr WRAN - Mr Chairman, I rise on a point of explanation. Clause B(3)(c) seems to me to give rise to the possibility of ambiguity. It refers to further amendments forwarded to the Resolutions Group. It is important that we delegates understand, if amendments are moved to the resolutions that go forward, how those resolutions will be dealt with by the committee and in what form they will come to the final plenary session.

For instance - this is very hypothetical - if there were a resolution with the Resolutions Group that a college of 400 persons be formed and after today there were an amendment that that should be 500 persons, would that amendment come back to the final plenary session or would it be dealt with by the committee and perhaps be incorporated in the original resolution? I think we need to know exactly what happens to amendments that are moved or submitted between now and the final plenary session.

Mr GARETH EVANS - You cannot legislate for commonsense. The intention is that the Resolutions Group nonetheless apply commonsense. The intention of the whole exercise, as explained in (2), is to bring forward at the end of the day resolutions which will assist the Convention move forward to an effective determination of the issues.

Obviously what the Resolutions Group will take into account is any further material coming to it by way of draft amendments or draft resolutions which do seem to reflect significant currents of view that are running in the Convention, that have been the product of further discussion, consultation, negotiation, or whatever, in order to expose clearly the issues for Convention delegates at the end of the day. That is the intention of the exercise.

If, for example, on the one that you put - you have got a model emerging from the votes this afternoon proposing a college of 400 - there is discussion over the weekend by the proponents of that particular thing and they have obviously got together and said, `It is a better proposal to make it 500, and we are advised in those terms,' it would go forward as 500. If you have got an individual delegate thinking in his own wisdom, but without consultation with anybody else, that it would be better if it were 500, probably, in that example, the Resolutions Group would say, `No, leave it in the form in which it was moved originally'- bearing in mind, and this is the final point, that it is always possible for any delegate to move from the floor or indeed, hopefully before we get to the final session, for any further amendment to enable a particular point of view to be exposed.

I add one more thing that I do not think Daryl mentioned in his further report. On the assumption that we will get to the final plenary session on Thursday, day 9, it is the intention of the Resolutions Group to have these final draft resolutions circulated to delegates the day before, on the Wednesday. Delegates will also be asked, if they have any amendments to the proposals coming forward to them from the Resolutions Group, to give them to the Resolutions Group on the Wednesday with a view to those further amendments being actually on the Notice Paper in their relevant places to enable again a clearer, less messy debate on the Thursday. That is the way we do it at ALP national conferences. It seems to work quite well, actually. We hope that that will assist. The whole point of the exercise is to have as commonsensical a fashion exposure of the issues.

Mr HOWARD - Mr Chairman, could I seek your guidance, and that perhaps of the rest of the Convention, on the question of the way in which the final question is put on day 10. It seems to me that there are two alternatives: you can have either a question generically phrased or the question: `Should Australia become a republic on the basis that the republic be in this particular form?'

My own view at this stage is that the way in which the final resolution should be handled is to, first of all, deal with the successive elimination of republican options; then that the one that receives the most support should then be pitted against the status quo in the final vote. That would seem to me to more sharply define the views of the Convention.

Obviously, delegates may have different views on that. But I just want an understanding that we are not selling the pass on any particular approach, and that we have an opportunity when we get to the final day to be perfectly clear as to the way in which that is going to be handled. I think it is very important to the conduct, and it is also very important to allowing people who may have a view in favour of the status quo to nonetheless express a view about the least worst alternatives - and I think that is very important in the spirit of a constructive approach.

CHAIRMAN - Thank you, Prime Minister. Can I respond by saying that it had been my thinking that, if we are to take the vote at the end of day 9 on the preferred model, whatever the form of the final question, given the undertakings that you have made on behalf of the government, it will, in fact, be measuring the status quo against the model that has emerged from this Convention - because, as you will all know, the Prime Minister has stated that he intends to consider the report from this Convention having in mind a subsequent referendum. That report, I would have thought, would therefore be predicated on whatever model this Convention might submit. So the final question - whatever its form, it will pick up the fact that it will be the model that emerges from this Convention.

Mr HOWARD - Let us assume that there is majority support - and this is just for the purposes of discussion, and I stress that so as not to offend anybody - for, say, the ARM proposal. I would have thought the final question should be: `Do you favour Australia becoming a republic on the basis that the head of state shall be chosen by a vote of two-thirds of the Commonwealth parliament, et cetera? Yes or no.'

The previous question has been put on the basis: `If Australia were to become a republic, do you favour McGarvie, do you favour a direct election, do you favour two-thirds?' I think we should vote on those first, and then the victor that comes from that should be pitted against the status quo. I think that is the most authentic way. At some stage, if that is to be the view of the Convention, I would like that to be affirmed so that there is no misunderstanding about it.

CHAIRMAN - Thank you, Prime Minister. I call on Dr Gallop.

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