Mr SHAW - While the issue of the powers of the head of state that we dealt with yesterday might have been the most conceptually difficult of the Convention's issues, I think the issue of appointment and dismissal has proved to be the most controversial. Could I just crystallise the three options: firstly, the appointment of the head of state by a constitutional council - the McGarvie model; secondly, popular election of the head of state; and, thirdly, the election of the head of state by a two-thirds majority of a joint sitting of the federal parliament.

In relation to the Constitutional Council, obviously it would involve minimal change and would be inexpensive. However, given the reserve powers which would most likely still reside in the holder of the office, I believe that there are real difficulties and risks in leaving the appointment in the hands of what would be essentially an unelected, unaccountable oligarchy. It is clear that the community expects the process of selection to be transparent and for there to be a measure of popular input. So whilst I appreciate the arguments for that option and it has obviously been put forward in the utmost good faith, I think there are practical problems and problems of principle about it.

As for the popular election, that has a simplistic, romantic attraction. We are told that that is what the people want. According to opinion polls, it is the most favoured method of selecting the head of state - certainly it would give every eligible voter a say in the process. But there are significant drawbacks which I believe should cause us to pause and consider whether it really is the optimal way forward.

It would obviously be expensive. The logistical difficulties of nationwide campaigns and the attendant costs would mean that the only realistically viable candidates would be those from major political parties or those with access to substantial funds - the independently wealthy, or those who are representatives of powerful vested interests. As other speakers have eloquently put, there is the danger of creating a rival power centre to that of the elected government. I would like to refer to the warning on this point given in a treatise on federal government by Madison and Hamilton, published during the negotiation and creation of the American Constitution. They wrote:

Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common enterprise or pursuit, there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office in which they are clothed in equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From either, and especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissensions are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability, weaken the authority and distract the plans and operations of those whom they divide. It might impede or frustrate the most important measures of the government and in the most critical emergencies of the state. What is still worse, they might split the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions.

This danger would be significantly increased, of course, if the powers of the head of state were left intact and unrestricted. This would be tantamount to effectively transforming our system of government. One consensus that I believe is discernible around this Convention, although not universally held, is that our system of government works well and ought to be maintained without radical or unnecessary change. An election which results in a narrow win for a candidate, especially if the contest is bitter, would then make it impossible for the victor to be a politically neutral and unifying symbol of the entire nation, which is precisely what the occupant of this office must be.

Some have argued in favour of direct election on the basis that it will give power to the people and will threaten the dominance of the main political parties. I believe that is, with respect, naive. If the people elect their parliamentary representatives almost exclusively from the ranks of political parties, they will also elect their head of state from the candidates put forward by the political parties. The elected head of state will give no more power to the people than the people's elected parliamentary representatives already provide.

The preference for popular election stems in part from an alienation from politics and a desire to bypass politicians in choosing a head of state. That dissatisfaction is a serious matter in Australia today but, in my view, it is not resolved by the direct election of the head of state. Although the public must ultimately take responsibility for the people elected, the political system as a whole, including the parties and politicians, should take note of the public's negative view of the system and work to improve it.

In my view, the best means of appointing the head of state is to have a joint sitting of the parliament and require a candidate to secure two-thirds of the vote at that sitting. In effect, the election within parliament will be a ceremonial process. The political parties represented in parliament will need to negotiate between them a candidate who commands as broad as possible support. A head of state so chosen will command at least bipartisan support and will be a unifying and impartial figure. The head of state will not feel like he or she has a mandate to act independently of the government. This will assist to maintain our system of Westminster government which has served us well to date.

Some have suggested that this method, like direct election, could also have the potential result of the head of state believing that he or she has a greater mandate than that of the Prime Minister. I think that view is misconceived. By being elected indirectly by a special majority of the parliament and by being accountable to the directly elected representatives of the people, the authority of the office of the head of state would be dependent on the authority of the parliamentarians. This would assist in ensuring that, although being above politics, the position of head of state would not assume the role of being above the government of the day.

May I turn to the issue of dismissal. Regardless of the mechanism by which the head of state is elected or appointed, dismissal should be by way of parliamentary removal. The determination should be made by a simple majority of the House of Representatives.

A question arises as to the grounds for dismissal. I do not believe the grounds for dismissal should be specified. The Prime Minister and the party from which the Prime Minister is drawn would be very unlikely to dismiss the head of state, despite there being no threshold finding of fact to be established. The electorate would hold the government responsible for any capricious or unreasonable dismissal.

If the Convention were to decide that the Constitution should provide a guide or a ground as to when a head of state should be dismissed, I think that some analogy is provided by section 72 of the Constitution which covers the removal of federal judges, including High Court judges. The formula in that section is `proved misbehaviour or incapacity'. This does not predetermine what facts amount to `proved misbehaviour' but, in any particular case, allegations of misbehaviour will depend on some allegations of fact which need to be demonstrated. This broad expression would include: crimes, the betrayal of public trust, as well as violation of the Constitution.

If the Convention does decide that there is some preliminary finding of fact needed - such as misbehaviour - before dismissal occurs, neither house of parliament is an appropriate body to make such a finding. A better approach would be to appoint an ad hoc committee or commission drawn from outside the parliament. This body would be provided with terms of reference framed in such a way that its task is strictly limited to preliminary findings of fact. The question as to whether the facts once found are sufficiently serious to constitute grounds for removal should be determined exclusively by the parliament. Within the parliament, the relevant determination should be made by the House of Representatives in accordance with its standard procedures. During such a process, the power of the head of state to dismiss a government or to dissolve the parliament without or contrary to the advice of the government of the day should be suspended. Otherwise, a head of state under the cloud of investigation for some alleged wrongdoing or incapacity could seek to escape the mechanism of accountability by causing a precipitant election.

In conclusion, I believe that the parliamentary appointment method contains the correct balance between the desire to maintain the best features of our current constitutional arrangements and the introduction of democratic input into the selection of an Australian head of state. The system of removal that I have outlined makes the Australian head of state accountable to the people of Australia through the majority of their parliamentary representatives. Thank you.

Mr COWAN - Before providing answers to the question before the chair, there are some quite fundamental issues which must be addressed by this Convention. The Constitution and the Commonwealth were created by the states arising from the conventions and the state referenda of the 1890s. The position of the states should not be ignored in attempts to shape a model for a republic. With a change to the head of state we will still have a federation, we will still have the states and we will still have one indissoluble federal Commonwealth. So the states cannot be ignored, nor can the people of any state, nor can the position of state governors who are the umpires of vital parts of our federation.

The states joined as equal partners in creating the Constitution and the Commonwealth. I would not support a situation where that Constitution divides or downgrades the equal status of the states. We should be sure that the consensus that was achieved in creating the Australian Constitution is achieved again, if such a fundamental change that Australia becomes a republic is to be put to the people. As a matter of principle, any referendum under section 128 of the Constitution to bring into effect a republic should only be assented to by the Governor-General under section 128 if passed by a majority of all voters and a majority of voters in all states. If this is accepted, it does provide a higher point of principle and consensus for the purpose of creating such a fundamental change to a republic.

It has been claimed by those proposing a republic that it will unify us as Australians, that we can more proudly be Australians with an Australian head of state - cut out the Queen and we can hold our head high among other nations at the Sydney 2000 Olympics as independently Australian. I have spent five years travelling the world promoting Western Australia, and I have never had the question put to me that I am not Australian because we have the Queen as our head of state.

If the majority of Western Australians decide at such a referendum that they do not want a republic, are they then any less Australian? If they decide, for whatever reason, that they do not trust a move to change their head of state, their Governor, do they renounce their Australian heritage or are they simply to be treated as misguided Australians who hopefully will come to their senses in time to make the supposed essential change? On page 4 in the executive summary of the Western Australian Constitutional Committee's report, there is a very important message:

The Committee has been impressed by the extent to which the many Western Australians who made oral and written submissions to it are conscious of their identity as both Australians and Western Australians. We would have a defective republic if, in the view of the majority of voters in any state, the Australian head of state was not really their head of state. Respect for the position comes from a general acceptance that the position carries the authority it deserves.

I would hate to see a situation where an Australian head of state would be welcome only by a minority of people in any state of Australia. A majority of voters in New South Wales cannot pave that welcome for the head of state in Western Australia if the majority of people in Western Australia do not equally think, feel and vote for it - and they will not grow into that view over time if they first reject that view at a national referendum.

If you believe this to be wrong, simply look at the issue of daylight saving in Western Australia which has had a long history of rejection at referenda. While a majority of eastern states enjoy daylight saving, Western Australia is different. While most people have an opinion about daylight saving, everyone accepts that it is not practical in that state. This is not an argument for separatism or special pleading. For those who wish to have a republic, it is not an argument for letting one state step on the hose or drag down the rest of the country; it is a democratic argument for ensuring that we are all part of the same country. It is also an inclusive and truly federalist argument.

A republic is not something that can be driven in over the top of people. I do not accuse those in the Australian Republican Movement of doing so; they do genuinely believe that the public will come with them. What I am suggesting is that should a clear model for a republic be developed by consensus from this Convention then the terms of a referendum for change should be drafted and put to the appropriate constitutional amendment processes; that is, at the Commonwealth level, a republic should be voted on in a section 128 referendum.

However, on issues that affect or concern state constitutions or governors, then state processes - whether state referenda or legislation - must be utilised. Therefore, a referendum under section 128 could be held in tandem with similar state referenda as they are required by state constitutions or legislation proclaimed to coincide with the outcome of the referenda. Should a majority of voters in all states decide to vote in the model for a republic, then this will come into effect for all Australians at the same time.

There is and should continue to be a clear distinction based on the federal nature of Australia's constitutional arrangements between the amendment of the Commonwealth Constitution and of state constitutions. Simply put, section 128 of the Commonwealth Constitution must not be used to effect changes to state constitutions. Apart from legal arguments about the limitations on the scope of section 128, the only appropriate way to effect changes to state constitutions is via the mechanisms which the states themselves have adopted.

There are no justifications either in principle or practice for section 128 to deal with, for example, the position and powers of state governors. Any attempt to do so will involve far-reaching consequences. Examples include: an unwelcome and unnecessary, not to say distinctly non-federal, development in the processes of constitutional change and amendment in Australia; the amendment of state constitutional structures, institutions and powers by a national referendum which is opposed by a majority of voters in the state. That is, unacceptable changes might, for example, be imposed on one or two states by other Australians.

If a section 128 referendum can penetrate so far into state constitutional arrangements to be able to remove state governors, then there appears to be no limit to what future section 128 referendums may do. To put it succinctly, the people in New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania could amend the Western Australian constitution or even the Queensland constitution against the democratic will of the people in Western Australia or Queensland. That is taking centralism too far.

The argument that those who favour a centralist or non-federalist approach by advocating use of section 128 to impose a republic at both the Commonwealth and state levels and disregard a true Australian consensus are not only standing on dubious constitutional grounds but equally importantly are throwing away the very basis of how our Constitution was created and continues to be sustained. It will rankle state parliaments and it will rankle voters in states - most definitely in Western Australia. Similarly, any attempt to use section 15(3) of the Australia Act to impose a republic on the Australian public would be undemocratic and unwise.

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN - I call the Hon. Denver Beanland, the Attorney-General of Queensland.

Mr BEANLAND - Thank you very much Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. Power and all of its aspects is the fundamental question on each issue which we are debating here at this conference. So far at this Convention, we have heard many conflicting ideas being expressed about whether or not we should have a president and, if so, what are to be the powers of the president.

I point out that our Constitution was founded on the principle that the people of the respective states, humbly relying on the blessing of almighty God, agreed to unite into one indissoluble federal Commonwealth under the Crown. If the Crown is to be replaced by a president, Australia must still remain one indissoluble federal Commonwealth. So far we have not heard any significant consideration of how this federal essence of Australia is to be maintained in the appointment of the proposed president.

Indeed, looking at the models put forward for the popular election of the president, with so-called `open nominations', it is nothing more than an elitist proposal with a select group of people and organisations becoming a presidential nominating committee. It is this body that would control the presidential nomination in a similar way to the elitist McGarvie model, which is even more under the control of an unrepresentative group. If we have open nominations for candidates for a popular election of the president they, to be successful, would either belong to a political party or be very wealthy independent candidates. All this is highly likely to lead to the election of a non-politician, as many claim is essential if a president is to be acceptable to the Australian people.

If a new president is to be accepted by the Australian people, then it is my submission that he or she will only be acceptable if the method of their appointment reflects the essential nature of Australia as an indissoluble federal Commonwealth. So far we have heard arguments for broad propositions which all suffer from the fatal flaw that, if adopted, they would enable the golden triangle of Sydney, Melbourne and Canberra to determine who is to be Australia's president and thereby ignore the interests and concerns of people from other areas of Australia. These models centralise power, to the detriment of all Australians. Unless all Australian citizens, whether they live in the Torres Strait, the Kimberley, at Esperance or at Zeehan, feel they have a real and proper role in the selection of their head of state, then the fundamental nature of an indissoluble federal Commonwealth will be put under strain.

I note that it has been claimed that a president can have the same power as the Governor-General - no more, no less. This view, with respect, is fallacious. The powers of the Governor-General, both as legislated and arising from convention, are the product of hundreds of years of development, from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy. Monarchy and all that means, however, remains an essential element of all such powers. It is contradictory to suggest that the president of a republic, where the essential concept is that power springs from the people and not from the monarch, can be the same as that of a governor-general whose power springs from that of a constitutional monarch. A president will have a mandate to represent all Australians, no matter by what process they are appointed.

The president will thus have a responsibility to all Australians in our great Federation, not merely to those elites who might be involved in the process of appointment. Suggestions for appointment of a president, even by a two-thirds majority of both houses of the Commonwealth parliament jointly sitting, will mean that, given the strength of the Australian political party system, only a president favoured by those persons who control the political parties will ever have a hope of being elected. Are the people of Australia going to accept a president so representative of the power elites?

A direct plebiscite of the Australian people will, regardless of presidential powers, give to the president a mandate to go forth and promote his or her causes which may very well be in conflict with the government of the day. The words of a president - I repeat, `words of a president' - no matter how appointed, are going to be powerful weapons in the political process of Australia. This will be so no matter in what form the powers are given to a president.

I have heard an attempt to argue that a Queenslander or a person from an outlying state could become a president if they are good enough. However, not only will they have to be good enough; they will still have to get the numbers from the golden triangle. We all know that the only Queenslander to become Governor-General got there because it was convenient for the power elite to get him off the political stage. He fulfilled the role with distinction, but it is unlikely that the circumstances which led to his appointment would be repeated in relation to the election of a president. This is a bone the elite will never surrender.

Again, suggestions for the establishment of a council of elders or wise persons to control appointment and dismissal of a president are also fatally flawed. Once more, the self-perpetrating power elites would be in control. Where is the federal balance in all this? I have heard proposals at this Convention for various forms of filters in order to ensure that only proper and suitable people are considered for the role of president. How arrogant! How elitist! How full of their own self-importance are those who advance these proposals! And we have a number of these proposals. They obviously do not trust the Australian people if we are to abandon a constitutional monarchy. Advocates of a popular election point to Ireland as an example of success of this system and use it to justify their support for such a process in Australia. This is nonsensical as when I last looked at the counties of Ireland they had not formed a federation. Further, it is a pocket handkerchief sized country compared with this vast land with an appointed, not an elected upper house - a very important point to keep in mind.

In Australia's case, it is the federal nature of our system of government that both recognises our origins and strengthens our institutions of government and saves us from the pressures and tensions that so bedevil other countries. It is vital that this be preserved, irrespective of whether or not Australia moves to a republic.

Other federations have addressed this issue of creating a mechanism for the appointment of their head of state which gives recognition to all factors, particularly that of mainstreaming or maintaining the federal balance. In the United States of America the Federal Electoral College, in recognising different weightings depending on differing populations of states, gives a capacity for the smaller political units of the federation to have an influence on the appointment of the President. On the other hand, I am much attracted by the principles inherent in the mechanism adopted by the German federation. There the President is chosen from an electoral college, chosen by the parliaments of the German states as well as by the parliament of the federation. Thus, the views of all citizens, no matter where they might live, are able to be represented through the mechanism which has been devised.

We should give real attention at this Convention to devising a system for the election of a president which recognises the essential federal nature of Australia. Unless we do so, then this republic, should it come to pass, being so promoted by republicans, could be just the first republic and be followed over the coming decades by the second republic, the third republic, the fourth republic and so on. Under this model, there would be no need for an elitist nominating committee. All Australians, regardless of their status in life, would be able to nominate. An election would be by a simple majority, as are all other elections for public office in this country.

We do a disservice to the people whom we represent here if we do not acknowledge that a republic is a fundamental change that will flow from our abandonment of a constitutional monarchy. If that is so, then any president must be chosen in a way that not only satisfies a majority within Australia but also is acceptable by the minority as being properly representative of the essence of Australia.

Our federal system, which is the basis upon which Australia was formed as a nation, must therefore be fundamentally reflected in the discussions that take place at this Convention and any proposition that might ultimately be put to the Australian people. Our strength as a nation comes from not only the way in which power is divided between our respective levels of government but also the way in which it is dispersed across this vast nation. (Extension of time granted)

I fear, however, that we have already seen at this Convention and from the proponents of the introduction of a republic an attempt to attack the fundamental federal nature of Australia. If this is not so, then I look forward to propositions being advanced by those who argue the republican cause which will ensure that Australia will indeed remain one indissoluble federal Commonwealth.

Ladies and gentlemen, we must keep in mind that any changes at all will have a major effect upon the states and upon the people living in the states and the far flung parts of those states. Even though these points have not been considered to date, I implore you to give very careful consideration of these matters in the coming days.

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN - I am giving the call to Chris Gallus, but this slight pause gives me the opportunity to appeal once more to people not to have mobile phones turned on. It is a gross distraction and a gross discourtesy to the members of the Convention. If you have a mobile phone on your person, make sure it is turned off.

Brigadier GARLAND - Throw them out, Mr Deputy Chairman.

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN - I am not quite sure how far my power extends to the galleries. It is easier to throw out a member of the Convention. Chris Gallus, the member for Hindmarsh.

Mrs GALLUS - I would like the delegates here today to remember that they are the people's convention. Half of you today were elected by the people. It is important that you remember that because I get the very strong impression that there are agendas in this room that the people who voted for you would say, `That is not what we voted for.'

In particular, I say to the Australian Republican Movement, when people ticked the ballot boxes for the ARM they never dreamt they were ticking the boxes of a party that was going to oppose a popular election. If they had known that, if you had honestly gone to the people and said, `The Australian Republican Movement opposes popular election,' you would not have got the votes that you got and your numbers today would not be in that block, they would be considerably smaller. I want you to think in your consciences about the people who voted for you and what they expected from you.

To the delegates today and those in the public gallery, I think all of us are very much aware that the Australian public is disenchanted with our political system. We have evidence of a fragmenting society. Not only do we have a large and growing class of permanently unemployed and, therefore, a growing inequality in this society but we have a disenchantment with the structures of our society and the whole political process. If we in this election turn our backs on the people of Australia and say to them, `The politicians will choose your president,' they in turn will turn their backs on us and the political process in Australia. Think of this when you vote.

Think about if you went today to the people and asked them who Sir William Deane was how many would be able to tell you. Everybody in this room would, but I can tell you, as somebody who deals every single day with people, that the great majority of people who come to my office do not know who Sir William Deane is. The problem, if you do not have a popularly elected head of state, will be that the people will not know who their head of state is because they will have had no involvement in the process.

We have to draw the Australian society together and one way is to have an elected head of state chosen not by a select group, chosen not by politicians but chosen by the people who should choose the leaders in our society - that is, the people. Ask yourselves: are we really a democracy or are we not?

I have found here today that, despite having a somewhat more old-fashioned point of view, you might call it, the monarchists are more likely to consider this proposition than is the republican movement. I ask the members of the republican movement to look to what they stand for and what they were voted in for and ask themselves if the people who voted for them did indeed vote against the notion of an elected president because I think they will have to say honestly that they did not.

There are problems with an elected president, but the model that was produced here this morning does get over those problems. Denver Beanland, who spoke before me, said that one of the problems with an elected president is that the process becomes owned by the political parties or by someone of great wealth. That can be avoided. You simply say that we do not allow any paid advertising and there is publicly funded media both print and electronic.

A further objection to a popularly elected president is that people may not want to put themselves before the public and talk to the public through the media. Then do not make them. There is no reason why someone standing for president or head of state - I am sorry we have removed the word `president' from the model we were looking at - has to speak for themself. A nominating person can speak for them. For instance, if the Manufacturing Council was nominating to the appointments council someone for head of state and that person did not want to talk for themself then somebody from that council could appear and talk for them and explain why this person has these qualities.

Do not dismiss this out of hand simply because you want another model. Think of its advantages. Think that we can find a way of giving the people what they want and still build in all those safeguards that we are so scared of losing.

The model that I presented here today has the ultimate safeguard: that if the head of state goes beyond the powers that the Governor-General presently has or that are given in the Constitution, the House of Representatives, by an absolute vote - which is simply a majority of the members of the House of Representatives - can vote for dismissal and, on that advice, the appointing counsel dismisses the head of state.

Some will say that gives too much power to the Prime Minister and to the government. But, if they make this decision and it is not a decision that is approved by the people, next time they will have to go to a popular election where the people will tell the Prime Minister and the government what they think of them. So the safeguard is built in. This is the safest model you can have to stop a head of state exceeding the powers that he or she should have. Please think of that and do not dismiss it out of hand, because it provides what the people of Australia have asked us to provide - an elected head of state.

When we vote, as we will, on the resolutions, my first request to you is to vote this resolution past the first hurdle. Many of you are coming from a different position and will not want to support it in the final analysis, but it is a good model and it needs an opportunity to be debated. If you refuse it this opportunity by voting it out of this Convention at the very first step, then I put to you that you are betraying the faith of the people of Australia who voted for you to come here to the people's Convention to represent them and what they wanted.

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN - The next speaker is Mr Thomas Bradley, followed by Professor Geoffrey Blainey, Sallyanne Atkinson and Eddie McGuire.

Mr BRADLEY - Mr Deputy Chairman, fellow delegates, ladies and gentlemen. This is a great day to have this particular debate because today, all over Australia, people are discussing dismissal. It is not the dismissal of the Governor-General, it is not the dismissal of a president; it is the dismissal of Mark Waugh. Yesterday Bill Hayden noted the safeguards about dismissal in our present Constitution. The most important of those was the availability of an independent umpire who could give a very quick decision.

If the models for dismissal suggested by the republican groups this morning were adopted, the people of Australia would still be waiting to know whether Mark Waugh was in or out and whether South Africa had won the test or not. Perhaps they would have taken a vote of all the spectators at the oval to see what the result was. Perhaps they would have recalled a cricketing parliament to debate and vote on the issue. Some would have selected a college weighted appropriately with men and women, and people of different ethnicity to ensure total objectivity, making sure that no-one who had ever played first-class cricket could vote. Still others might have called together a group of eminent former test captains so that they could decide the issue. But the simple truth about this debate is that the motives of the various participants and the path to resolution of this issue are being obscured, whether deliberately or unconsciously, by myth making, by sophistry and by rhetoric. Sometimes the things that we fail to say speak much more eloquently about what our motives are than the words that we do use.

I have been sitting here watching, and I have listened with quiet amusement to the unconscious irony of members of the Commonwealth, state and territory parliaments criticising proposals for a direct election of a president on the basis that it would produce a politician. Somehow we are expected to believe that a body of 228-odd members and senators choosing a head of state will not choose a politician. This is mere sophistry. Really, whether the head of state is a politician or not is not the real issue at all.

On the other side of the great republican divide sit the proponents of popular sovereignty. They have transformed this idea into something that says: allowing the Australian people to elect a president will somehow empower them or give them control in a way that the current system of representative government fails to do. This popular sovereignty is really a myth. Certainly it is a powerful myth. Perhaps it is as powerful as the old myth that this country was peaceably settled rather than conquered; that the Commonwealth, rather than the Ngunnawal people, holds this land we stand on today by some means other than by force. Our myth of popular sovereignty is almost certainly a useful myth. It helps to bind us as citizens to our governments. It even persuaded Sir Anthony Mason to say that ultimately sovereignty resides in the Australian people. There has been much talk here today about theory and about reality. Popular sovereignty is our constitutional theory, but the reality is otherwise.

The reality is that the power of the state is always awesome; it is a power that can crush the citizens, particularly minorities, but sometimes even a majority. In this century we have seen, even in the heart of Europe - even in the most economically, technologically and culturally advanced nation - the power of the state reach out and crush its citizens. When it was not content with that, it launched that barbarism on the rest of the world. In this decade we have seen the same happen in the heart of Europe, in East Africa and elsewhere. In our tradition, the leviathan of state power and the argument between the head of state and the head of parliament was resolved about 350 years ago when the head of state lost his head. Introducing a head of state, however named, with some claim to legitimacy, however elected, risks reviving that old dispute. It risks reviving the leviathan of state power.

At this Convention, and earlier in Queensland in other debates, I have listened to the advocates of popular election. I have heard Clem Jones say that we Australians have lost respect for our leaders, that what we need is a strong, powerful elected president that we can all look up to and respect. It will make us feel better about ourselves. It will restore our faith. This talk has awful echoes. It says: what we need is strong leadership, someone to make the trains run on time or perhaps - if Jennie George will forgive me - someone to make the wharves run more efficiently.

Be careful what you wish for: you might get it in bucketfuls. This is the sort of talk that inspired Italy in the 1920s and, God preserve us, Germany in the 1930s to decide on very powerful, central decisive leadership. The more secure the head of state is, the more secure he or she will be in the exercise of state power. Be careful. If you live in a dictatorship it is vitally important how you choose and who the person is that is president, because the president decides everything. But, if you live in a democracy, it is the freedom, the quality and the abilities of your citizens that are vitally important because they choose your leaders.

Popular sovereignty can function only if the power of the state is restrained. Popular sovereignty depends on this and on the ability of the citizens to act independently. The drafters of our Constitution knew this well. The key to understanding the Australian Constitution is understanding how it deals with power. It does this in a very particular way. It divides it, it checks it and it balances it between the Commonwealth and the states, between the executive and the courts, between the courts and the parliament and between the executive and the parliament. Within the parliament itself, the power is divided between the House and the Senate. This intricate web of divided, balanced and checked power is itself a compromise between the spectrum that runs from the efficiency of dictatorship to the mire of gridlock at the other end of the spectrum.

I offer the view that most Australians' understanding of the word `president' is so dominated by the overwhelming influence of American popular culture that Australians automatically associate the word `president' with popular election. It makes no sense to them to talk of a president who is not elected by the people. But look at the United States. There the power of the president is almost entirely a negative power. It is the power to veto the laws enacted by the Congress. The only realms left free for a US president have traditionally been his personal and foreign affairs. And we should not be surprised - as that other great US institution, the media, encroaches more and more on the President's personal life - that the prospect increases daily of bombs over Baghdad.

A key element in the myth of popular sovereignty is the idea that electing a president every three, four or five or seven years somehow gives us control and empowers us as citizens. But drafters of our Australian Constitution knew that the key to popular sovereignty was really public accountability. Under our Australian Constitution, the bridge across that naked public place is the architecture of responsible and representative government. We elect members and senators; they choose Prime Ministers and ministers. Our elected representatives keep the ministers accountable to them because those elected representatives are accountable to us.

The gulf between a US president and a US citizen is enormous and unbreachable. In America that space is filled by the power of vested interests and associated lobbies. The gulf between us and our cabinet ministers is filled with local members and senators, with party bodies, with parliamentary caucuses - with all sorts of infrastructure. Sometimes they can deliver our barbs and bouquets very effectively. If sometimes they do not, the situation will not be improved by evacuating that space and leaving an US style presidential gap.

Another piece of sophistry that has been run here today is that in a republic every citizen could aspire to the highest office in the land. (Extension of time granted) That has been said a number of times here, but it ignores the very real role of money, power, influence and the media, particularly in presidential policies. Yesterday our Treasurer said that our national symbols had run out of believability, that the monarchy was no longer acceptable to the democratic temper of the times. For a moment, I took him seriously. But then he went on to propose a council of eminent persons to replace the Crown. How, I asked myself, was this in keeping with the democratic temper of the times? How is the secret handshake among the great and the good an acceptable symbol and process to encapsulate our national identity? Let those ways remain in the privacy of your lodges. They do not inspire me and they do not represent a symbol in which I can believe. I think if you want a truly Australian method for selecting a president the only choice is the lotto model where every citizen is assigned a set of numbers and a fading television personality presides over an electronic draw. Perhaps Mr Vizard might be available!

If we want to change simply to get the symbols right, then the McGarvie symbols are not the right symbols. This leaves us with the ARM model. Will we buy a used car from these people? What has really astonished me about the official Australian Republican Movement is they want to design this elaborate process and mechanism to alter the Australian Constitution all for the purpose of changing the Constitution in a way that means no real change. I am reminded of a Bruce Petty cartoon with this great structure articulated in order to transfer fluid from one point to the next. I have much sympathy with the Reverend Tim Costello's view that, if you want a republic, you should at least want a real one.

But I am a republican of a totally different kind. My political philosophy is more strongly influenced by Plato's account of Socrates' views in The Republic. There the fundamental problem was clearly identified for republicans. The persons most suited to rule are the most reluctant to do so, while those who offer themselves readily as candidates are the least desirable. Our own history teaches us this and the great men and women who have served as governors and governors-general are not the sorts of persons who are likely to submit themselves to parliamentary or popular election. The best candidates have always had to be conscripted to serve. This is what we do today in this crowned republic, the Commonwealth of Australia.

What is the evil, I ask myself, that the republicans seek to cure? The answer lies not in Plato but elsewhere. I think Reg Withers identified it very clearly yesterday when he pointed to the hubris or the pride. The answer is not in Plato or Socrates; it is in Machiavelli, who said, `The greatest of men are the founders of new regimes'. Take care that pride comes before a fall and the greater your pride the greater the fall will be.

Professor BLAINEY - While many of the delegates express increasing concern about public attitudes to politicians, my feeling after the third day of this ordeal is that my respect of politicians has increased out of sight.

May I briefly look at several merits and defects of the evolving constitutional monarchy in Australia, including the qualifications of the Queen and the Governor-General, and then offer a few comments on the replacement that might be sought? First a word about the monarchy. I think, in the debate in the last couple of years, there has been a tendency to overkill; and more effort has been put into destroying or distorting our present system than into finding an alternative.

For example, it is right that the talents of Australian women, so often neglected, should be prized. At the very start of our proceedings there was a firm call for `gender balance' by those eager to strike out the monarchy. The calls were repeated by a working group this morning. But the calls would have been more persuasive if they had humbly acknowledged that in the history of Australia since self-government the monarchy was for long the only official position where women had a chance. For 100 of the last 150 years, a woman has been the monarch. In your quiz days, Mr Deputy Speaker, you would only take a second to confirm that conclusion.

There are valid arguments against the hereditary principle embodied in the monarchy and I am mindful of them. The arguments sometimes have to be taken with a grain of salt. Mr Keating, in attacking our constitutional monarchy, our de facto republic, said that the hereditary principle was outrageous, but he was slightly indignant when it was pointed out to him that his own chosen version of the native title legislation relied more comprehensively on the hereditary principle than any law hitherto passed by an Australian parliament. If it is right to uphold the hereditary principle in this important law, we should be a little more discreet in denouncing other hereditary institutions which are essentially symbolic.

After listening to Mr George Mye's eloquent and moving speech about the place of the monarchy and the church on Darnley Island in the Torres Strait, I began to think back; and I became aware that Catholics were acutely conscious that somebody of their faith could not become a monarch, and it was probably true of the evangelical Methodists, Salvationists, the members of the Church of Christ, Baptists and many others. One has to be conscious of the defects there are in the monarchical system.

Politics in Australia is played with vigour and intensity, and the vigour and intensity have probably increased since the early 1970s. This vigour would impose pressure and strain on the Governor-General and the presidency, if such a post should be created. Under these pressures, a neutral political umpire and an appropriate bearer of national symbols is vital. If the umpire is not neutral, or is not perceived as being neutral, the danger of a polarisation is high at the very time when the umpire is called upon.

Significantly, many of those who were foremost in denouncing Sir John Kerr are also to the fore in praising Sir William Deane. And many of those who praised Kerr are now beginning, both privately and publicly, to criticise Sir William Deane, whom they see as combining the twin roles of Governor-General and shadow minister for social welfare.

In the last two days it has been revealing to see in this Convention the enthusiastic minority support for Sir William in his present activity as a persistent advocate. One does not mind a Governor-General advocating, and sometimes one will agree, but to be a persistent advocate is to take on the role of a parliamentarian. The same enthusiasts would be indignant if the next Governor-General or president turned out also to be a crusader, but crusading on the other side of politics.

Australia needs a relatively neutral Governor-General, a representative of every Australian of every background. This is essential for the sound operation of what is a highly combative political system. Many Australians, wishing well of the Governor-General, as I do, will hope that he will quietly pursue a more representative role.

I do not agree with Malcolm Turnbull when he says that the day of the politician as governor-general or president has ended. My own view is that we have had, in the last 40 years, four political Governor-Generals - McKell, Casey, Hasluck and Hayden - and I think they have done their task with skill.

My belief, my own fear, is that if Australia becomes a republic, even a minimalist republic, the Governor-General, whoever he or she is, will become much more influential than today. The temptation to make use of that influence in partisan ways will be higher. The temptation of governments to appoint a partisan governor-general or president will also be higher. I see no way in which a new president will have merely the same influence as the present Governor-General. Everything will create an aura of prestige and influence around that person.

What then is the answer? At this stage of the Convention, my preference is clearly to retain, at least for the time being, the system we know. That means reminding the Governor-General of his duties and his delicate role. But if there is to be a change in the way of appointing or electing the Governor-General I see no easy answer.

Should we elect the president or Governor-General? I am not completely against the idea, but the arguments against election are strong. An election might well give us in the space of 10 years a very different system of government - an elected president competing with an elected Prime Minister in an atmosphere of perpetual instability. If more democracy is to be implanted, it should be implanted in the body and not in the ceremonial head.

I believe I am a democrat, and one of the Australians I most admire is John Quick of Bendigo, who devised a democratic formula unique to the world - setting out the steps by which the six colonies should become a federation. I think I am sympathetic to the idea of initiative referenda, but I am wary of turning the Governor-General or the president into a competitive Prime Minister.

Again, should the president be appointed by a joint sitting of the two houses with the selected name requiring the support of two-thirds of the combined members? In my view, and I could be wrong, this would give the president a double political blessing and a higher political platform. This worries me. I do not want a president who is too powerful. Moreover, if the electoral system is changed and proportional representation is abolished in the Senate, it will happen in the future, as has happened in the past, that either the coalition or the Labor Party will possess that two-thirds majority in its own right, thus enabling a partisan appointment.

The Hon. Richard McGarvie - all honour to him for his contributions long before this Convention began - has put forward his scheme of an advisory council of three wise men and women. I have some sympathy with his scheme, but so far I am not convinced. His written paper is powerful diagnosis of the flaws in an elected president and a two-thirds president. (Extension of time granted) I am most grateful. I will finish quickly. The Hon. Richard McGarvie has written this powerful diagnosis; it is in the papers presented to you. He also hints at the weaknesses in the present system. When I read recently page after page of recent majority decisions by justices of the High Court and I saw their belief that they see themselves as barometers of public opinion, I would not wish such crusaders, such pollsters, to be on the council.

Finally - this is really one of the most difficult questions, and I do not believe it has been discussed - which individual should be eligible as president if we have a president? The Queen could almost qualify to become an Australian citizen while remaining Queen of the United Kingdom, so lax are our present citizenship laws. The government altered the law in the 1980s to confer citizenship on those who knew nothing about the country, who had lived here only two years, who knew no English and who wished and were enabled to pursue divided loyalties. This exotic law undermines a key republican argument that the head of the state must be filled by Australian citizens who owe their first allegiance to this country and no other. I think this difficult question must be looked at with more care.

If there is to be a president, the qualifications for that office will require serious thought. A strict rule that the president be born here would be too restrictive, though it is the rule in the United States and Finland and several other nations. The recommendation of today's working group - that `any Australian citizen on the electoral roll is eligible for the presidency, - reveals a simple faith in the accuracy of the electoral roll. Australia will be the first nation on earth to make a dead person eligible for the presidency. This makes me see some merit in the present system, though I will continue to listen and pray for resurrections.

It is easy to criticise the present system. But the devising of a superior system is a harder task. We have a long way as a nation to go.

Mr WRAN - Mr Deputy Chairman, I raise a point of order. I require an explanation. I would like to dissociate myself from the shameful attack upon the present Governor-General made this morning by Professor Blainey. I am sure I speak for right-minded people at the Convention.

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN - Your point has been noted, although it is strictly out of order.

Ms ATKINSON - The appointment and dismissal, along with the role and powers of the head of state, are at the very heart of the matters that we are here to discuss. We are here to listen, to assess and to evaluate. I think it is fair to say that we have all taken two weeks out of rich and full lives to come to Canberra to do so. We have heard not only today but in previous days some very good and thoughtful contributions and debate. None better was the contribution of our eminent historian Professor Geoffrey Blainey.

It is also true to say that this is a very representative body of men and women, young and old, indigenous, European born and Asian born Australians. It represents the full gamut of the Australian community. In that, as has been said, it is very different from the convention 100 years ago. I make these points to say that we are charged with the task of putting together and recommending a constitution for our time.

Before I came to this place, as I know many others did, I thought about what we want for a nation. I came to the conclusion then that I believe in a republic for the future of Australia. What I think we are here to discuss in the detail is the process of such things as I have mentioned before. I have to say to this body that I have sympathy with the concept of the direct election of the president. I have that sympathy both as an ordinary citizen who likes to have a say and as someone, along with Clem Jones, who has actually been directly elected to an important political position.

I have lived in France for some years. I have seen a president popularly elected. I have seen the Irish model that we have talked about. I have watched Mary Robinson at work. I can say that those systems or presidencies work well in those republics because they are republics of other nations and they are from those nations and of those nations.

We are here together as Australians. We want an Australian republic designed for our needs, for our people and for this time. Those of us who are working for a republic are doing so in the context of a very precious democracy. I can say that I can see in the direct model our institutions at risk - those institutions for which Australians have fought and died and about which Mr Ruxton and Brigadier Garland have spoken so eloquently.

Our Constitution is a legal document and must withstand the scrutiny of the courts. I have not yet heard from my friends who are stuck fast on direct election as the only option as to how our institutions are going to be protected. They, like me, must explain, particularly to the Queenslanders who have sent us here, how their rights in the Senate will be safeguarded. They should also explain - it has not yet been explained - how under their model the head of state would actually be elected and dismissed, what powers the head of state would hold, how an election under their system would be held, what would be the cost and how frequent those elections would be.

The other model that has been put forward to this gathering is for a constitutional council, which also has a degree of desirability and attractiveness about it. But it is a model that I think I would have to reject after some thought. It is seen as being elitist. It is certainly seen as providing another tier of government, which people in this nation patently and obviously do not want. It is seen to be undemocratic because it is invisible and not transparent to public election. Very importantly, it gives no sense of public ownership. If we are talking about a republic and a president, we are talking about something and someone that will be owned by the people of this nation.

The model we have heard about, which is commonly called the McGarvie model, with its nominated candidate for head of state would probably be unlikely to include women or indigenous Australians or, has been pointed out, Australians from other states. I believe that the bipartisan parliamentary approach is the fundamentally democratic one. It provides an avenue by which any person in Australia could potentially be considered. The diverse make-up of our parliament will mean that many perspectives will be represented. Those choosing will represent a real cross-section of Australia. Those of us of the female gender have complained in the past that parliament is not yet made up of people in exactly the same proportions as the general population. But it cannot be denied that it is diverse and becoming increasingly so. Women, young people and those of ethnic backgrounds all enjoy more than token representation.

I am a democrat. I am a member of the Liberal Party of Australia. I am a Queenslander, and those of us who come from north of the border know that is a fairly important distinction. I believe very strongly in our institution of parliamentary democracy, and that is why I strongly support our elected representatives in the federal parliament electing our head of state by a two-thirds majority of a joint sitting.

This is the ARM's position for appointment of head of state, and it is innately democratic. It has always been our main position. We have always said that we are prepared to entertain other suggestions and look at other models, but I think we are firmly of the view that the Prime Minister would nominate and recommend the proposed head of state to the parliament. It would be the responsibility of the parliament for our elected representatives - accountable to us in an open, transparent forum - to elect our head of state, our first citizen. The parliament would also be accountable to the people, in the extraordinary circumstance of removing our head of state by a simple majority, in the House of Representatives in which governments are formed.

I believe that Australians are ready and desirous of moving towards a republic. I believe, in keeping with our national character and history, we shall do this by evolution - a revolution certainly would not suit us. Here this morning I believe that the system put forward by the ARM is one that is truly accountable, truly democratic and certainly truly Australian.

Mr McGUIRE - Mr Chairman and fellow delegates of this historic Constitutional Convention, first may I say what an honour and privilege it is to stand here today as the No. 1 elected candidate for the state of Victoria. This is the first time that I have been involved in affairs of state, and I must admit that during the past two days I have enjoyed some of the theatrics, overblown rhetoric and political dogma of those desperate to claim a big headline and perhaps an historical footnote for prosperity.

Despite the humbug, however, I have been inspired by speakers of integrity who have thought deeply about the historic significance of the task at hand and who appreciate the degree of difficulty in achieving constitutional change with support from the majority of the people and the majority of the states.

Becoming a republic is not about barracking for your favourite team. This is about judging the strengths of arguments to ensure that we deliver a system of government that in 100 years will be respected as we respect the document that formed our Federation. The principles of the document have endured but, given that we are coming to the end of the most tumultuous and progressive century in the history of mankind, it is not surprising that an overhaul is overdue to deal with the needs and aspirations of a sophisticated, multicultural, egalitarian society on the eve of the 21st century. As I said, I have sometimes enjoyed the drama, the hype and the posturing of the first two days of this Convention, but let us get back to reality and let us get on with the job at hand.

So how can we elect the head of state? Despite exhaustive discussions about what a direct election would look like, other delegates and I are yet to hear a simple, practical and realistic proposal that delivers the goal of an apolitical head of state. We have all heard the arguments from the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, the Treasurer and other eminent constitutional experts who confirm the paradox that a directly elected head of state would almost certainly be a politician.

So how do we go about beating the system? Whenever I ask this question, all I see is blank faces and vague and myriad proposals. The proponents of direct election have an opportunity here, indeed a responsibility, to clearly spell out what they want, how it will work and what the legal consequences of their model really are. It is time for them to deliver the detail and answer questions such as what kind of election is proposed, how often it would take place, whether it would held in conjunction with other elections or by itself, how much it would cost and whether it would result in a consensus outcome if a candidate could win with a small primary vote and become Australia's head of state by riding into office on the preferences of weird and wonderful single-interest groups, especially those opposed to diversity in our community.

The opponents of direct election have told us that it will inevitably become a race between major political parties or those who can garner enough financial support to turn it into an election extravaganza. What about the concept of an Aussie having a shot at the top job then, let alone the inherent dangers of our head of state owing electional favours?

The kind of person who should be Australia's head of state would not be part of such a process. Our head of state would stand above and beyond party politics, act as an impartial, constitutional umpire and embody the very character of Australia. Until I hear a viable alternative, I keep returning to the policy that has always been preferred, the preferred model of the Australian Republican Movement, the result of a seven-year campaign. And, despite some curious claims, this policy is very well known: that the head of state should be elected by a two-thirds majority endorsement of the Commonwealth parliament, the core of our democracy - thus ensuring bipartisan support. We fundamentally agree with the desire for direct election but believe, in the absence of a realistic plan that we have been waiting on for some time, that the onus should be placed now on our parliamentarians to deliver what we elect and pay them to do, and that is to consider and appoint the best possible person for the job. The proposition that some highly politicised election campaign at a cost of up to $50 million will deliver a better choice just does not add up when you think about the person we are looking for.

The proponents of direct election have not been silenced by yesterday's events. They still have every opportunity to argue why an election will unearth the right head of state and how this can be achieved. Today and tomorrow are set aside for this very purpose, and I look forward to it with interest. The debate is not over, but if this option is to gain support we need to hear a detailed, coherent case for direct election which will be acceptable to the Australian people. Former Victorian Governor, Mr Richard McGarvie, has proposed a model for an Australian republic with a head of state who is appointed by a constitutional council of three eminent Australians, on the Prime Minister's advice. This model has positives and negatives. As a method of choosing a head of state, it is elitist. Under this model it is highly unlikely that a woman, an indigenous Australian or Australians without a lofty legal background will ever be members of this council - never mind be considered as a head of state.

I maintain that the election of a head of state by a two-thirds majority of a joint sitting of federal parliament is far preferable and can deliver a head of state who really does reflect the diversity and richness of our nation. However, the former Governor and I have discussed at length his concerns over the potential difficulty a Prime Minister could face in obtaining a two-thirds parliamentary majority to dismiss a Governor-General if the government did not have the numbers in its own right and opposition parties obstructed the move.

For that reason, as a method of dealing with the rare and exceptional occasions when the Prime Minister might want to sack the head of state I propose that the Prime Minister with a simple majority of the House of Representatives be able to do so. I believe this improves the McGarvie model, because the Prime Minister would have to go before the people's house to dismiss the head of state, return then to parliament to secure a replacement and, ultimately, be accountable to the people at the next election for his or her actions.

I believe that these are the improvements that the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and others have been seeking. I urge them to examine them and reassess their positions. My belief is that this Convention must go beyond political self-interest and put the nation's interest first. We have been elected to be responsible leaders, and if that means making hard decisions instead of decisions driven by popularity polls or working hard to find consensus then so be it. I look around this chamber and see a lot of famous faces: men and women who have been - and those who still are - part of the daily political process, and a number of others who show every sign of making their contribution in the future. I wish them well. But I come here having been given a once in a lifetime opportunity to make a contribution to the beliefs about this country that we hold dear that, whatever your birthright, your race, your gender or religious beliefs, you are entitled to the opportunity to make the most of being an Australian. Unlike my father, and others here today, I have not had to put my life on the line to defend liberty. Fortunately, my sacrifice for my country will have to be enduring 10 days of speeches here at the Convention. But I am prepared to hear all arguments in pursuit of the right outcome, because I know the right decision is not necessarily the easy option.

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN - Point of order?

Next Page

Previous Page